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**OBSERVATIONS**  
**ON THE**  
**DISCOURSE**  
**OF**  
**NATURAL THEOLOGY**

**BY**  
**HENRY LORD BROUGHAM;**

**CHIEFLY RELATING TO**  
**HIS LORDSHIP'S DOCTRINE OF THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE HUMAN MIND,**  
**AS PROVED BY PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA;**  
**THE APPLICABILITY OF THE INDUCTIVE METHOD OF PROOF TO NATURAL**  
**THEOLOGY, SO FAR AS RELATES TO PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTS;**  
**DREAMS, ETC. ETC.**  
**AND THE BEARING OF THE "DISCOURSE" ON DIVINE REVELATION, ETC. ETC.**

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## TO THE READER.

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READER,

THE following Observations are written by one who, firmly believing in the Immortality of the Soul, acknowledges his ignorance whether that soul be material or immaterial. It is also his firm conviction, that *certain* knowledge on that subject is neither attainable by man in his present state of existence, nor necessary for the government of his concerns, either as they respect this world or the next.

The very recent publication of Lord Brougham's work on Natural Theology, however, not only expresses his decided opinion that the mind is in its essence immaterial, but professes to *prove* that it is so, and that its immateriality is essential to its existence in a future state. Being persuaded that the revival of that disputed question is, in many ways, injurious, and that the immateriality of the soul is neither proved by his Lordship, nor proveable, the

writer offers these observations to recommend a suspended opinion, where certainty is unattainable. Written as they have been, within a very few days after his Lordship's work had reached Dublin—under the influence of first impressions—not with a view to controversy, but to deprecate it on a subject on which he thinks all controversy must be fruitless—he has not attempted to disturb the long forgotten tomes on which the dust that covers them would indicate that the subject of them had been set at rest, (*pulveris 'haud' exigui jactu compressa quiescunt!*) and has resorted only to the obvious, and perhaps trite arguments, which former, habitual (now an almost faded) recollection of the subject suggested to him; he knows there is much both in the manner and the matter of the Observations which he submits to you, that calls for your indulgence; perhaps they are tautologous—perhaps ill-arranged—he solicits, however, that indulgence; if it be withheld, he necessarily submits himself to your justice, but hopes from *that*, at least, an acknowledgment that his motive was laudable.

# OBSERVATIONS,

ETC. ETC.

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WHEN Necker was dismissed from the Councils of his unfortunate Sovereign, he neither yielded to chagrin nor to indolence. —He applied his leisure, his learning, and his talents to a work which has raised him as a man, a philosopher, and a christian much higher than he could ever have ranked as a statesman, had he remained in the high office to which his private virtues had called him. In that work he made the laudable, though for the time unsuccessful, attempt to impress upon his countrymen the great value of just, rational, and practical religious opinions, as applicable

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to the maintenance of social order, and that necessary subordination without which society cannot subsist.—The scope of this book—the doctrines which he inculcated and the arguments which he urged were in no respect polemical—they were such as a cultivated philosophical mind, habitually conversant, however, with the Christian creed, would derive from a well understood Natural Theology. There was in this truly patriotic labour nothing sectarian—nothing of controversy—its sole object manifestly was to promote public peace and social order when *out* of office, as he had endeavoured when *in* office, to forward the general interests of his country. The motto of his book appears to have very truly stated his motive and his object—and I believe it not inapplicable to those which suggest Lord Brougham's present treatise : “*Pristinis or-  
bati muneribus, hæc studia renovare cæpi-  
mus, ut et animus molestiis hâc potissimum*

re levaretur et prodessemus civibus nostris quâ re cumque possimus.”

It is delightful to witness in our own times, a still more striking example of this kind—a nobleman of the highest order of intellect—of the most extensive and varied acquirements in every branch of human learning, after having passed youth in the discharge of the most arduous duties of a laborious profession, to which were early added those of a political writer, an assiduous and unwearied legislator, and finally, those of one of the highest and certainly one of the most arduous offices in the state—it is, I say, truly delightful to see such a man, when delivered from, or escaping the weight of official labours, resuming with renovated energy the philosophical pursuits of his earlier studious life. Such a man is Lord Brougham ; who now gives to the world, as the first-fruits of his resumed liberty, a Discourse on Natural



Theology. The short history of this remarkable book is given in a dedication to Lord Spencer. He tells us, that after the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (a Society which we owe to him) had been formed, the composition of this Discourse was undertaken in consequence of an observation which he had often made, that scientific men were apt to regard the study of Natural Religion as little connected with philosophical pursuits—that many of them relied little on Natural Theology, esteeming it to be, at any rate, a kind of knowledge quite different from either physical or moral science—that it therefore appeared to him desirable to *define more precisely than had been yet done, the place of Natural Theology, among the various branches of human knowledge*—that the Society had early been urged to publish an edition of Dr. Paley's work, with scientific illustrations, and that Lord Spencer (then Althorp) and he, both

favoured this plan, but that some of their colleagues justly apprehended that it might open the door to the introduction of religious controversy among the Society, against their fundamental principles—and that the scheme was then abandoned ; that he, Lord Brougham, had, however, thought it expedient to carry the plan into execution, and that with the co-operation of Sir C. Bell, a considerable progress was made in the work ; that from 1830 to the autumn of 1834, parts of the present work were written ; and that now, having ceased to hold the Great Seal, his further leisure is devoted to the completion of this object. The first volume of three, which are to complete the series, has been recently published, and is intitled a *Discourse of Natural Theology*. One principal and professed object of the work is to shew that Natural Theology is a science—that its truths are discovered by induction—and that there is no solid or specific distinction between the *method of investigation*,

or the *nature* of the *evidence*, on which we ought to pursue human science and Natural Theology—and that in both the method by induction is a safe guide to truth.—The undertaking is every way worthy of the great talents and various learning of his Lordship. To prove by reason, unaided by revelation, and therefore in a way that precludes the cavils of sceptics against revealed religion—to demonstrate by arguments, derived from sources within the reach and comprehension of the great mass of mankind, and in a way intelligible by the average quantity of intellect and information which they possess, that the universe we behold and in which we exist, is the work of an intelligent and all-powerful Being—that it is and for ever must be, during its continuance, under the “rule and government,” the control, guidance, and perpetual, particular, and most minute superintendence of this supreme intelligence—and that the attributes of this great Being are, Benevolence, Justice,

Wisdom, Truth, Omniscience, and Almighty Power,—to derive from them satisfactory evidence that the exercise of the public, private, and social virtues are his will, and have his sanction—and that rewards and punishments for the observance and the breach of those duties are in his hands—to do all this, or to endeavour to do it, is the great scope and object of NATURAL THEOLOGY. So far then as his Lordship's work tends to give Natural Theology a high place in human knowledge, and to prove its adequacy and efficacy for those purposes, it is impossible for an honest mind not to wish that his labour may be successful; and it is equally impossible not to lament, if, in discharging this voluntary and arduous task, he should diverge from the straight path which might lead to success in pursuit of this desirable object, and that either by aiming to attain what is not within the fair scope of his pursuit, or to display talents, or learning, or address in

controversy, he should, instead of accelerating, materially retard his progress towards the goal he aims at, and possibly frustrate, finally, his main purpose.

The first volume of this work is now before the public. It was naturally looked for with the most eager anxiety—great expectations were formed of such an undertaking, on such a subject, by such a man; and assuredly much has been done by it to give Natural Theology as high a place as it is capable of sustaining, among the sciences that guide mankind toward that knowledge which, if it do not reach absolute scientific truth, may approach as nearly to it, as it is reasonable to expect on subjects that in their nature are not capable of strict demonstration.

May it not, however, be permitted to free and friendly criticism, to inquire whether, even in this work, as far as it has gone, *that* has been done which might reasonably be expected, and in the manner least dan-

gerous to sound philosophy and rational religion? Can it be attributed to invidious feeling—to critical malignity—or a want of due zeal for the success of such a literary or scientific labour, if a perfectly private individual neither having nor pretending to a scientific or literary character, and who has certainly outlived the ambition to acquire, even if it were within his power to attain one, shall venture to say, that some things have found their way into this volume which a friend to its object would not wish to meet there—some things which unnecessarily lead to the evil that appears to have been apprehended when this work was contemplated—“*Religious Controversy*,”—and things, I will add, which might well have been avoided—because in no degree necessary to the purpose which the Noble Writer and philosophical statesman professed to have in view. Such an opinion, however unimportant mine may be, I cannot but admit, I have reluctantly formed—I ven-

ture to avow it, in the full consciousness that my object in doing so is eventually to forward rather than impede the main and professed design of the work, by shewing that those portions of it which inevitably lead to interminable controversy, are not *necessarily*, or, indeed, in any degree, properly, made part and parcel of the discussion. The object of the following observations shall principally be to point out where, and to what extent, his Lordship has fallen into this error.

It has been already observed that one of the proposed objects his Lordship had in view was, to shew that Natural Theology is a science, and that the truths of it are discoverable by induction, like those of Natural and Moral Philosophy. In an analysis, which he gives at the commencement (and which is, perhaps, a little too minute and complex), he divides the First Part of his "Discourse" into seven sections—in the third of which he compares the psychological branch of

**Natural Theology** (that which treats of the faculties intellectual and active—but of existences only) with psychological science, and shows that both rest on induction.—In the fifth section, he treats of the **Moral, or Deontological branch of Natural Theology**, and shows that it rests on the same kind of evidence with **Moral Science**, and is, strictly speaking, as much a branch of inductive knowledge.—It is with these two sections I shall have chiefly to deal, and therefore I omit stating the others, as beside the present purpose.

From any thing in this statement of the object and design of the Noble Writer, or from the title which he has given to his book—"A Discourse on Natural Theology," it is not very apparent that it was either necessary, or perhaps a very natural or eligible way of effecting his main purpose, to introduce, as an instance of the kind of inductive proof necessarily connected with any branch of Natural Theology, a meta-



physical and theological proposition, still, and ever likely to remain, a subject of debate and controversy in the religious and philosophic world ;—nay, is it not obvious that to do this, was both inconvenient and dangerous ; inasmuch as by doing so, the advocate of inductive proof in the science of Natural Theology, takes upon himself to shew, not only that this controverted proposition naturally belonged to a class of proofs appropriate to that science, but, also, the additional—perhaps the *impossible* task of establishing the disputed proposition itself ? This, however, is precisely what the Noble Writer has done—for in the very first sentence which follows the Analysis of the work, he announces his intention of entering at large into the subject of the *Soul's Immortality* ; which the reader almost immediately afterwards finds to mean—the “ IM-MATERIALITY of the soul ! ” That he should have done this is, I cannot but think, much to be lamented—for many there undoubt-

edly are, who after having often and long reviewed the arguments on this difficult question, and found themselves incapable of deciding on which side the proofs preponderate, retired from the inquiry, deriving from their labours one only advantage—but that no inconsiderable one—that, however the question of the soul's immateriality might be decided, there is enough, abundantly sufficient, of evidence, and that too of the inductive kind, and within the province of Natural Theology, to satisfy a reasonable inquirer, not demanding *demonstrative* proof—that whether the soul be material or immaterial in its essence, *we shall live hereafter!* Even the plain spoken Paley suggests enough to tranquillize upon this momentous subject.\*

When Natural Theology alone, then, was

\* For this, see Paley's Natural Theology, the three penultimate paragraphs, beginning at the words, "They who have taken up the opinions," &c. Also the five last paragraphs of his Evidences of Christianity.

found sufficient to console us with the reasonable probability of a future life, even without the aid of revelation ; and when, to the Christian world at least, revelation comes in aid of the doctrine, and demonstrates that our confessedly material part, body, as well as soul, shall live hereafter, and that even our “ mortal part shall put on immortality,” have we not some reason to complain that, with an intention however good, one of the greatest spirits of the age should step aside from his direct path, and endeavour to narrow our hope and darken our prospect of future existence—should labour, while professing to elucidate and strengthen those indications which natural science itself suggests to us, *that we shall have an existence hereafter*, to embarrass by teaching us, that the *possibility* of a future life depends on the *contingency* of an abstruse and metaphysical question being decided *one way*, namely, that the substance of the human mind is *immaterial*—a ques-

tion upon which absolute certainty can never be had in our present state, and with respect to which, therefore, we must await either the period of an utter annihilation, or, the *actual* commencement of that new state of existence, which religion, both natural and revealed, leads us to hope! Yet this certainly is what his Lordship does, by assuring us in precise and absolute terms that “The *immateriality* of the soul is the foundation of ALL the DOCTRINES relating to the future state—that if it consists of material parts, or if it consists of *any* modification of matter, or if it is inseparably connected with any combination of material elements, *we have no reason whatever for believing that it can survive the existence of the physical part of our frame*—on the contrary, its destruction seems to follow as a necessary consequence of the dissolution of the body.”—*See page 100—1st part of 8th Section of the “Discourse.”*

This doctrine is frequently and emphatically repeated in the 3rd and 5th Sections of the first part of the work—and we are told “that those sections are not, like the others, mere *logical* discourses, in which the doctrines of Natural Theology are assumed rather than explained—but that the subjects of those two sections not having been *sufficiently handled*, in professed treatises upon Natural Theology, which have been almost wholly confined to the proof of the Deity’s existence and attributes, and to the physical portion of that branch—to this *defect* he endeavours to apply himself.” Indeed, it is in substance avowed that hitherto the writers on Natural Theology have not thought that this high theme—the *essence of the human mind*—was within the limit of their proper province—but that his Lordship thinking otherwise, now introduces into a work, having for its professed object to give its proper place to

Natural Theology among the sciences, this most difficult, perplexing, and to a Christian Public, most useless topic—the Immateriality of the Soul!—*useless*, inasmuch as whether the soul be material or immaterial, the Christian Creed inculcates that, not only the human mind but the human body, are destined to immortal existence. Surely it could not be necessary in arranging Natural Theology in its proper place among the sciences, to introduce for *discussion* and *decision* a metaphysical dogma like this ; though it might, possibly, have been permissible, to enumerate among the subjects which fall within the range of that science whatever *established truths* may exist connected with the nature of the soul, and which might furnish matter for *inductive* reasoning to extend or give stability to the science itself—What beneficial purpose could be answered by introducing into such a work a disputed and *most* disputable question, and which *because* it is disputed,

and while it shall continue so, can furnish no inductive matter either for proof or illustration! Did it not occur to the Noble Lord that the writers on Natural Theology who had preceded him, and, as he admits, omitted to discuss or entertain this metaphysical and vexatious doctrine, did so with design, and because they were of opinion that it was neither necessary nor useful to introduce *doubtful* doctrines, in the hope of extending *certain* knowledge—and that therefore the negative precedent was one which ought to be followed? And is it not strange, too, that it should escape his observation, that, *possibly*, the introduction of a doctrine teaching us that if the human soul be material or connected with any modification of matter, that soul *must die with the body, whatever revelation might teach to the contrary*, might, as far as the influence of his argument and doctrine went, tend to weaken and contradict that revelation?

But may there not be still other grounds

of objection to the introduction of this discussion on the immateriality of mind into this particular treatise, which professes to have for its prime object the placing Natural Theology in its proper station among the sciences? And does not such an objection arise, and one of no mean import, if it shall be found that by the introduction of it, he, in some degree, makes a disputable and unproved fact, one of the principal supports of the science the rank of which he seeks to raise? Yet such, I think it will appear in the course of these observations, is the result of introducing it.

How does Natural Theology appear to be at present misplaced or degraded? His Lordship, indeed, has observed that scientific men are “apt to regard the study of natural religion as little connected with philosophical pursuits; and that, though some of them were men of religious habits of thinking, and others were free from scepti-



cism, rather because they had not much discussed the subject, than because they had formed fixed opinions upon it after inquiry, but the bulk of them relied little upon Natural Theology, regarding it as a speculation built rather on fancy than argument, or, at any rate, as a kind of knowledge quite different from either physical or moral science." But, the misapprehension of those gentlemen respecting Natural Theology, or their irrational neglect of it on the grounds stated, certainly does not at all affect the real nature, or the station of Natural Theology among the sciences, as they are understood by those who estimate them on true and rational grounds. It is very true, that in one respect, namely, so far as it depends on psychological science, Natural Theology has been considered to hold a less safe and elevated station than physical science—and indeed, it appears to deserve his Lordship's particular consideration, that it differs from

physical science, at least in this—that from the nature of the proofs on which it must, in a great measure, rest,—proofs short of the precision and certainty which those in physical science possesses—it is greatly liable, therefore, to suffer by the fallacious and fanciful reasonings of unsound logicians, who may take assumptions for proofs, and build hypotheses upon ill-ascertained facts and experiments resting on the unsupported evidence of single witnesses—or on mere impressions supposed to be made upon, and honestly felt by, minds under the combined but unconscious influence of interests and prejudices. In all this, Natural Theology suffers as a science—and if this places Natural Theology in a lower station than is held by other sciences, I much fear there is no remedy for the evil—none certainly that can raise its *rank*—though its *character* may be elevated, undoubtedly by the labours of those judicious professors who reject, as not legitimately belonging to it, all those loose

and conjectural arguments, which, to a reasoning mind, bring no conviction; but which, trite and popular themselves, give their own character to the science which admits them, and thus degrades it below the rank which it would and ought to hold, if more judiciously and cautiously treated. His Lordship has certainly advised, and contends for, what necessarily, if adopted, and as far as it shall be adopted, must raise the character of this science—the mode of *Induction*; but it must be an induction carried on upon the safe ground of experience—reasoning from things actually and positively *known* to what is sought, being *unknown*—and, above all, by abstaining from reliance upon opinions instead of proved facts—avoiding all fanciful hypotheses; and, finally, proceeding in the pursuit of knowledge, with the sole intention of finding truth, whatever may be the immediate result to our previously declared opinions, or our private or party interests.

Many circumstances occur to shew, that, in Natural Theology, we have not the same advantages—the same facilities—for proceeding in this Induction as we have in the physical and abstract sciences—and that the inducements to deviate from the strict and cautious rule are strong and numerous.—Civilized society is parcelled out in classes, each of which has its connection with a particular creed, or a particular party, entertaining notions in religion—in politics—in the general business of the world—peculiar and exclusive in their bearings on each of those who are connected with these sects or parties; and, in that way, giving a bias in various and opposite directions, to the wishes and pursuits of those individuals. This is not the case in the other sciences, where, generally speaking, it is the interest of all who cultivate them, to arrive at the truth by the most summary and safe methods.

Again,— the nature of the subject matter

in the physical sciences on one hand, and theological, or psychological sciences on the other, is totally different. In the one, material nature being always the same—always furnishes a constant, invariable, and patient subject for human experiment and inquiry, and, generally, rewards the inquirer with additions of actual and *indubitable* knowledge, proportioned to his sagacity, his industry, and his patience :—moreover, the acquisition of this knowledge, when made, constitutes a safe, honourable, and profitable possession. It is not so, unfortunately, in Natural Theology—or in any of the branches of science which is founded on the faculties of the human mind, or even revelation itself. There, the inquirer is not only trammelled by the opinions and the interests of the religious, or other party to which he belongs, and from which he feels, at all times, the strongest inclination, and the most important interests pressing him to avoid separation or dissent.—

but he finds, too, that every thing connected with the research after truth on subjects of that class, is, from its nature, remote from the possibility of *conclusive experiment*, and that there is little to guide the inquirer, except the already declared opinions of others who have preceded him, and each of whom in his turn had been obliged to labour under similar disadvantages and disturbing causes in the inquiries which he had made, and on which he had pronounced, in concurrence with his political or religious party, a dogmatical, influential, and perhaps most erroneous opinion. If the last inquirer shall have discovered the error or the cheat of his predecessor's opinion, he has, as a prudent man, to consider well whether it tends to his worldly interest, or his ruin, to avow and teach his own, and expose that of his predecessor, or quietly content himself with the monopoly of his own discoveries, and let the world become

wiser hereafter at the expense of his successor. How few, indeed—how very few are there in society who venture to avow opinions which they really entertain, on the most important subjects, connected with the religion or the government of the country in which they live, when the prevailing and *authenticated* opinions, and the *safe* profession of the majority, are in opposition to or variant from theirs? On the very subject on which his Lordship has written—the Immateriality of the Human Mind—the justness of this remark is obvious—for though one might suppose that on such a subject—of so abstracted and so neutral a character with respect to party or sectarian interests—affecting in no way the sanctions of morality, virtue, or religion,—the question being decided either way would be matter of indifference; yet, considering the preponderancy and great majority of numbers, which, in one way or other, many of

them (different probably from that of conviction upon argument) the side of *immaterialism* has gained over, how reluctant may not many an honest but timid mind be in dissenting from the avowed opinion of his friends, his party, or his superiors, on such a question. Under how many most serious disadvantages, indeed, does the impartial and independent inquirer come even to the discussion of such a question as this? and how incalculably more numerous are they who think it prudent not to engage in such an inquiry at all, when conviction of truth on one side may involve them in so many inconveniences.\*

\* The main ground on which the contest for the immateriality of the soul has been raised, is the belief, or opinion, that the mind would suffer a species of degradation if supposed to be destructible like matter—destructible even as to form and organization. It arises also from the notion, that the mind must have some superiority *justly* attributed to its essence, as its functions are apparently so supereminently above what is supposed to be the limited



It is under such circumstances, not favourable, certainly, that the question on

capability of inert matter. Now, it is a curious inquiry, how among Christian Philosophers and Christian Teachers, Matter should have ever fallen so low in estimation as to be thought unworthy of any thing like *identity*, or even *inseparable companionship* with the soul; for certainly belief in the doctrine of the "*Resurrection of the body and its life everlasting* with the soul in the future state," is inconsistent with such a disparaging opinion of matter. One wonders the more that such a notion should have arisen, when it is recollected, that though among men professing such a creed, it is believed that the raised body is to have some added qualities to constitute it, what has been called, a glorified body,—yet the doctrine was and is, that the body even when so glorified, must *still be strictly and literally material*; for a total change and substitution of what was *not* material for what *had been* so, would be an entire change of its nature, a substitution for the body of something essentially different, and would be totally inconsistent with the doctrine taught and believed. How, for instance, might it not affect the fundamental doctrine of the Resurrection of the Saviour, if it should be contended for, or *admitted*, that it was not really and truly the *same material* body of the Saviour that had been buried, but something quite different, call it glorified, or immaterial, or by any other name, that

the Immateriality of the Soul is now introduced, and discussed at large by his Lordship, as if necessary to his main pur-

was raised? But if a *material* body shall actually be raised, and made an immortal participator with the soul in a future eternal life, it must follow that *ipso facto* matter would be proved to be in no degree inconsistent with any of the higher, indeed the highest qualities of spirit or mind,—yet strange to say, it is in that body of men who so believe and so teach, that we find those who most violently impugn the doctrine of matter being susceptible of the qualities and powers which they attribute to the immaterial mind only: and it is among them that we find the metaphysical dogma producing the greatest quantity of evil, mixed up as it is with, if not producing, theological hatred and discord. Will it not be for the peace of the religious world if the day shall arrive when the minds of men shall be neutralised, and led to hold at least a suspended opinion on a question on which error can produce no mischief, whatever may be the truth? For surely the interests of religion or virtue are in no way endangered by a suspended judgment, or by ignorance on the point, as at whatever side truth may be, those interests are effectually secured by the belief (which always remains unaffected by the materiality or immateriality of the soul) that there will be a full recompense in a future life for all that has been done well or ill in this.

pose in raising the rank of Natural Theology as a science, or as an instance to recommend the manner and proof by *Induction*. Enough, I think, has appeared to shew that the topic was not *essential* to his purpose ; but I will even admit that if the discussion of it could in any degree promote his object, he was, to *that* extent, warranted to introduce it. Let us, then, examine a little whether the decision of the question either way could in any degree be useful toward his professed object. Natural Theology, we have seen, has in view to prove by means not connected with revelation, the existence and the attributes of the Deity, and the consequences that result by mere reasoning from the phenomena of nature, physical, psychological, &c. In the first instance, then, is it not manifest that whether the mind of man be material or immaterial, the *phenomena* from which alone facts for induction can be drawn, or by which any

given proposition in Natural Theology is to be established, must be identically the same? How, then, can it be essential to the interest of truth in Natural Theology that the mind should appear, or be proved immaterial rather than material? Is not *that* question most perfectly neutral with regard to such an object? It is indeed a question of fact, which in the view of a mere *psychologist*, may be of importance to *him*. If his purpose be, as it will naturally be, to ascertain truth generally with respect to the essence or faculties of mind, on which he professed to philosophize, then, certainly, the question of its *immateriality* becomes relevant and necessary to his purpose, and falls naturally within the range of his inquiry. But when the question arises with relation to a Natural Theologist, whose duty is simply to derive proof of the Deity from the phenomena of nature, and of the human mind, as part of that subject matter, it surely is

indifferent what may be the latent essence of the subject on which he philosophizes, since the *phenomena*, those which are the same in the one case as in the other, are the proper scope and material of his inquiries and argument. If indeed the Natural Theologist could devise an irrefragable or even a stronger argument for the existence or the attributes of the Deity, &c. from the supposition that the mind was immaterial, than the belief that it was essentially mere matter, there might be some shadow of reason for endeavouring to prove its nature immaterial; but such a supposition is manifestly untenable in this instance, for the wisdom, the goodness, the power, the justice, or the benevolence of the Deity, are all equally inferable from the one hypothesis as to the Essence of Mind, as the other. Indeed, if one might, upon such a subject, use the inconclusive argument *ad hominem*, it might be successfully used

against the Immaterialists upon this subject—for they contend that it would be (if one may understand or reverentially use such an expression) more difficult for the Deity to confer on matter the powers or qualities they attribute to the mind, than on the immaterial subject they call the human soul,—nay, by many of them it is broadly alleged that it is impossible even for the almighty power of the Deity to confer the thinking and reasoning faculty on mere matter.—If this be so, what possible object his Lordship can have had in view in patronising the immaterial hypothesis, and introducing it *quâ sponte quâ vi* to his readers, passes the limits of my comprehension.

I come now to the inquiry whether, whatever may have been his Lordship's motive for introducing the question, and with a species of metaphysical knight-errantry espousing the Immateriality of the soul, he has achieved his purpose. Has he

done it by the *inductive* method as a proof or illustration of the excellence of that mode of reasoning?—or has he even cleared the question of any of the difficulties with which it was embarrassed? He has accumulated around this favourite dogma a vast variety of observations and arguments—but I cannot find on the most attentive consideration of them any thing like *proof*,—but there is *assumption* without end.

Fully persuaded that the noble and enlightened writer will not consider the most free comment on the manner in which he has treated a philosophical and theological question like the present, as disrespectful, if satisfied of what, I most sincerely assure him, is true—that revering his high talents and extraordinary acquirements, and admiring the very many things that are admirable in his treatise, I have no object or wish in any observation which shall be made by me, but to assist respect-

fully, not in searching for the truth on this interesting subject—but to prevent possible error. I shall proceed, therefore, in the first place, to state in his own language the only matter (I cannot call it *proof*) which he has offered to support the doctrine of the immateriality of the mind, and to examine as fairly as I am enabled to do its weight and efficacy.

In the 2nd section his Lordship had compared the truths of Physical and those of Natural Theology.—In his 3rd, he deals with the Intellectual System as equally fruitful in proofs of an intelligent cause, though he complains they had scarcely ever found a place among the speculations of the Natural Theologian.—The nature of what his Lordship calls proof respecting the existence of the mind, had been distinctly stated in the first section, page 20, and in page 56, the third section, it is repeated—and in very many places throughout these, as well as the following sections, he



in every instance *assumes* the mind to have a separate existence—*independent of body*. The complaint is that it is *assumed only*—no where proved—unless it be so by what he calls *consciousness* of its existence.

Page 20,—“The proof of the *mind's separate existence* is at the least, as short, plain and direct as that of the body or external objects.” Page 56—“The evidence for the existence of mind is to the full as complete as that upon which we believe in the existence of matter—indeed it is more certain and more irrefragable—the *consciousness of existence*—the *perpetual sense that we are thinking*—and that we are performing the operation *quite independent of all material objects* PROVES to us the EXISTENCE of a Being *different* from our bodies.”

The first of these statements announces the *separate*, i. e. *independent* and *distinct* existence of *immaterial* mind. The second states, not merely the proposition to be proved, but the alleged proof of it—viz.

'consciousness, or, the *perpetual feeling* we have that we are *thinking quite independent* of matter—which, it is said, proves the existence of a *mind, different from our bodies*—that is, *immaterial*; and in the way of comment on the nature of this proof, it is alleged, that it affords evidence higher than any we can have for the existence of *body* itself, or of a *material* world.

It is important to remark here that the writer in both those propositions uses the word *mind* without any definition of the sense in which he uses it—though, it will be found, that the *exact* sense of that term is most material in the argument ; for “mind” in common use, and in this treatise, is used in very different meanings with respect to the precise *thing* or *being* it is intended to express. A definition, therefore of *mind* would greatly aid the inquiry as to the truth of the proposition here laid down ; if it were given, the meaning of the term would probably enable us to decide on

the truth or inaccuracy of the proposition—the want of it, leads to ambiguity and great difficulty in the discussion: for instance—If, as the materialist contends, what he calls the mind is nothing more than the thinking power, or *that* in which the power inheres, and that *that* is a certain organization of matter, namely, the brain—the proposition to the materialist, (i. e. that *consciousness* of thinking *proves* the existence of *mind*,) in *his sense* of the term, would be true, for certainly the consciousness of thinking would be proof that *that* without which thought could not exist, does at the moment exist; and if, as the immaterialist contends, the *mind* is not a certain organization of matter, but what he calls an *immaterial* being, distinct from the body, and in which immaterial being the power of thinking, and the *consciousness* of it, which is *thought itself*, inheres—the proposition would be admitted to be true also by him according to his understanding of the

term mind ; in other words, each taking the term mind in his *own sense of it*—both would admit it to be true—but the proposition would be *actually* true or false, only with reference to the psychological truth, and it therefore would be true only with respect to one of the parties and false as to the other, though from want of definition it would appear *true to both*. To make the proposition, therefore, really significant and intelligible, his Lordship should have explicitly stated in what sense *he* meant to use it. Let this inaccuracy however pass ; and let the word be taken in what appears from the context to have been his Lordship's meaning, namely—  
 'That *mind* means the thinking power and that *that* is an *immaterial* being,' then the result is that the Noble Writer has palpably begged the question—for what is his proffered proof ? *Consciousness of thinking* ; but consciousness of thinking, proves nothing as to the mind's being *material* or *immaterial* ; for *in either case* we should be

conscious of the act of thinking, and though we are thus conscious of thinking, it does not follow that the *thinking* thing is *matter* or *immaterial*. Consciousness of thinking proves that thought exists, and that something which is the *cause of* thinking exists, but it proves nothing as to *what* the thinking thing is.

But he is guilty of another gratuitous assumption ; he says, that in consciousness of thinking, we are performing the operations of *thinking independently of all material objects*. Must it not depend on the opinion we had previously formed as to the nature and source of thought, whether our consciousness of thinking be an operation performed quite *independently of all material objects*? or, whether the consciousness, which is thought, must not depend on the material organ ? If we think that consciousness and thought is the result of bodily organization, we will be of opinion that it depends *entirely* upon *material* objects. If the consci-

ousness we have be of the enjoyment of a purely sensual pleasure, there cannot be a question that material objects have been the cause, and most probably the exclusive objects of our thought, and our consciousness can in no sense be *without any dependence* on material objects.

Hence, nothing can be more obvious, than that his Lordship's reasoning, or his language at least, on this subject, is not only loose, but perfectly inconclusive. See what the question is—it is, whether there be any evidence of the existence of mind distinct from, independent of, and capable of a separate existence from matter. His Lordship says, *consciousness of existence proves it*; ask him *how* it proves the fact?—there is no answer—and then the reasoning comes shortly to this—“Consciousness of thinking is an act of thought; thought is an act of the mind; therefore it proves the existence of mind; but *mind* (assumes his Lordship), thinks quite independently of all material

objects, therefore *there exists a being different from our bodies.*" There is not a shadow of proof in this apparent reasoning; and, in fact, it is but a new edition of the Cartesian logic, with an improvement by his Lordship. "*I think, therefore I exist,*"—said Des Cartes; "*I think, therefore my mind is immaterial,*" says his Lordship! Assuredly this defect of argument here is not cured by the observations of his Lordship which follow in this same passage, where he enumerates "*instances in which the perception of matter derived through the senses, are deceitful, and seem to indicate that which has no reality at all;*" and yet, we know, that *sensation* is *perception*; for there can be no *sensation* without *mental perception*—and that perception is *consciousness*; for we cannot have *perception* without a *consciousness exactly corresponding* with it. Yet his Lordship, admitting that this *consciousness* even as to perception of matter, is often false, rests his proof, first, on the assumed fact, that the

*consciousness as to thinking is true*—secondly, that this consciousness proves the existence of a mind, and that mind, *a being different from our bodies*, i. e. is immaterial !

His Lordship has another passage in this same paragraph, p. 57, which is made to assume the appearance of another argument, tending the same way as the former. “It is barely possible,” he says, “that matter should have no existence, but, that mind, the *sentient* principle—that the *thing* or the *being* which we call *I* or *we*, should have no existence, is a contradiction in terms: of the two existences, then, that of *mind independent of matter*, is more certain than that of matter *apart* from mind.”

Now here again we have nothing but repeated assumption of the thing to be proved—viz. : First, he assumes mind to be not matter, but a *sentient* principle. Secondly, he assumes that, if we deny the existence of this *sentient* principle which we call *I*, “we fall into a contradiction in



terms ;" but why a contradiction ? for admitting, as we must, that consciousness is proof that the *thing* which thinks exists ; we deny only, that mind is distinct from or independent of matter, and thus only contradict that which *he*, not we, *allege* it to be. How can it be a contradiction in terms, to deny that *mind* is entirely distinct and separate from matter, while we assert that mind (i. e. a result from, or modification of matter) does really exist, and is that thing which we call " I."

In all that his Lordship has hitherto said on the subject in proof of the existence of mind as an immaterial substance independent of body, the utmost we can possibly find is, his *assertion* of that existence. That something exists which thinks, he asserts, and every one admits ; but that *that* is existing independently of our bodies, or capable of a separate existence from matter, is assumed by him, and denied by the Materialists. He calls it, indeed, frequently an

immaterial substance ; but this epithet in no way guides as to *what* mind *is*—it describes only by the negation—“ it is *not* material.” On this question, then, the reader is called on to say does he feel himself competent, upon his Lordship’s statement, to form for himself any satisfactory definition or idea of *what* the essence or substance of the human soul really is ? I acknowledge *I* am unable : and I apprehend that we shall never, in our present state of being, be able to do so—that before we shall be competent to answer this important inquiry, we must await, not further visits from the Schoolmaster, who is abroad, but the coming of that Great Teacher, whose arrival we may rationally hope will enlarge our faculties, and open to us a new volume of the creation. In the mean time, however, it would be very gratifying if from the confessedly great powers of the Noble and Learned Writer, we were favoured with something like a definition

of mind, such as it is understood by him to be constituted—how produced—and any way, *how*, if connected with the body, from which, he says, it has a *separate* existence. The definition one would seek, however, is not like that which we are at present obliged to be content with, and—which is nothing beyond a *description* of its powers, functions, attributes—thinking, perceiving, abstracting, comparing, judging, willing, &c.—Until something *beyond* description such as this shall be had, something defining it as to its essence and substance, no valuable addition to psychological knowledge can be obtained, nor any progress made in inquiries like the present. For that which is not the *essence*, but the *act* of what is called *mind*, may continue with fruitless controversy to be attributed by one set of disputants to organization, and by another, perhaps, with as much rational confidence, to an immaterial mind.

After his Lordship has in this third sec-

tion made these positive averments that the *mind* is immaterial, alleging that it is so on no other proof, but that *consciousness* is evidence of it, without showing *how* it is so, he refers us to his fifth section, where he is again to introduce the same subject in discussing the constitution of the soul with reference to its future state. But before he quits the present section (third), he in the next paragraph proceeds to do what is no doubt fairly within the scope of his work, and that is, to reason from the *operations* and *functions* of the mind—which, he contends, are *as much* the subjects of inductive reasoning and investigation as the structure and actions of matter. He has, as yet, the reader perceives, given no *proof*, or even argument to shew that the mind is not itself matter. He rests entirely on the gratuitous assumption he has made on that subject—namely, that consciousness proves that it is not matter. However, whether it be matter or immaterial, whatever may be the functions,

faculties, or acts of the mind, these, no doubt, when fully proved to exist, and *as* they exist, are perfectly fair subjects (though certainly not *so safe* or *so fit* subjects as matter) of inductive reasoning, to prove intention and design in the Creator—the proper province of Natural Theology. In this section there then follow some beautiful and instructive illustrations of the various powers of the mind evincing design, arising from the different mental phenomena. The Reasoning Power, Curiosity, Memory, Habit, the Feelings and Passions, the Desire of communicating knowledge, &c. are all eloquently urged as proofs of Design in the Great Author of the Universe, and these are followed by a passage eminently eloquent and beautiful, suggested to the mind of the writer by a view of the intellectual world. This passage cannot be read without the highest degree of pleasure and profit by any who have raised the tone and temper of the mind to a taste

for the contemplation of such subjects. What he says of *habit* particularly deserves the attention of the reader : it contains a vivid description of the varied and wonderful power exercised with miraculous rapidity by the eloquent extempore public speaker, and may be taken, though not intended by the (in this instance *unconscious*) writer, as descriptive of the high faculties which have been so often displayed by himself in the various situations in which they were called into successful exercise. Though it has no relation to the subject we are immediately considering, I cannot resist giving it to the reader.

“ The effect of *habit* upon our whole intellectual system deserves to be further considered, though we have already adverted to it. It is a law of our nature that any exertion becomes more easy the more frequently it is repeated. This might have been otherwise : it might have been just the

contrary, so that each successive operation should have been more difficult; and it is needless to dwell upon the slowness of our progress, as well as the painfulness of all our exertions, say, rather, the impossibility of our making any advances in learning, which must have been the result of such an intellectual conformation. But the influence of habit upon the exercise of all our faculties is valuable beyond expression. It is indeed the great means of our improvement both intellectual and moral, and it furnishes us with the chief, almost the only, power we possess of making the different faculties of the mind obedient to the will. Whoever has observed the extraordinary feats performed by calculators, *orators*, rhymers, musicians, nay, by artists of all descriptions, can want no further proof of the power that man derives from the contrivances by which habits are formed in all mental exertions. The performances of the

Italian *Improvvisatori*, or makers of poetry off-hand upon any presented subject, and in almost any kind of stanza, are generally cited as the most surprising efforts in this kind. But the power of *extempore speaking* is not less singular, though more frequently displayed, at least in this country. A practised orator will declaim in measured and in various periods—will weave his discourse into one texture—form parenthesis within parenthesis—excite the passions, or move to laughter—take a turn in his discourse from an accidental interruption, making it the topic of his rhetoric for five minutes to come, and pursuing in like manner the new illustrations to which it gives rise—mould his diction with a view to attain or to shun an epigrammatic point, or an alliteration, or a discord; and all this with so much assured reliance on his own powers, and with such perfect ease to himself, that he shall even plan the next sentence while he is pro-



nouncing off-hand the one he is engaged with, adapting each to the other, and shall look forward to the topic which is to follow, and fit in the close of the one he is handling to be its introducer ; nor shall any auditor be able to discover the least difference between all this and the portion of his speech which he has got by heart, or tell the transition from the one to the other."

But to return. Let it never be forgotten, that, however surprising may be the extent, or however delightful the exercise of these mental powers, they cannot affect the main question, viz.—whether the mind be material or immaterial ; for the high or the low state or character of any mental faculty can afford no proof as to the nature of the *essence* of the mind. Nothing could be so unsafe as to rest a scientific truth on such a foundation as the more or less, the higher or lower degree of any quality : it can support nothing but a guess—a conjecture—

and remains at an infinite distance from *proof*. Indeed, it may be permitted to observe here, and for the reason just now suggested—that while we remain, as we now are, in a state of profound ignorance of the essence, and in a great degree too even of the functions and powers of the mind, Psychology in its present state must be one of the most unsafe sources from which to derive matter for philosophical *induction*. Reasoning on such an induction is to reason *ab ignoto ad ignotius*; and it is with as much diffidence as respect to his Lordship, that I say, in my opinion, whatever error his Lordship has fallen into, if he has erred at all in the present work, is by assuming and using as inductive proofs, *supposed* facts taken from theories and *persumed* operations of Mind, of which we have nothing like that certainty which in physics we obtain with ease and absolute truth from the power we possess of forcing Nature, by experiment,

to disclose her secrets. In physics she is willing, when wooed, to disclose *facts*, but she keeps *mind* to herself.

Great, however, as are the powers which mind seems to possess beyond what might be supposed within the reach of matter, judging of its inferiority according to the scale on which the advocates for immateriality rate corporeal substance, it is not a little remarkable that his Lordship, in a very eloquent passage (p. 72), admits that the immaterial mind appears to exhibit, in the early stages of its existence, little or nothing of the lofty and superior nature which is attributed to mind over matter by the Immaterialists—for he acknowledges, that the mind *owes much of the qualities and powers which it boasts in its advanced stages to the “modulation” which it receives from “exercise and training,”* and which goes to the *extraordinary* length of “producing as it were new forms of the understanding.” This remarkable passage is as follows:—

“ At first sight, it might be deemed that there is an essential difference between the evidence from mental and from physical phenomena. It may be thought that mind is of a nature more removed beyond our power than matter—that over the masses of matter man can himself exercise some control—that, to a certain degree, he has a plastic power—that into some forms he can mould them, and can combine into a certain machinery—that he can begin and can continue motion, and can produce a mechanism by which it may be begun, and maintained, and regulated—while mind, it may be supposed, is wholly beyond his reach ; over it he has no grasp ; its existence alone is known to him, and the laws by which it is regulated ;—and thus, it may be said, the great First Cause, which alone can call both matter and mind into existence, has alone the power of modulating intellectual nature. But, when the subject is well considered,

this difference between the two branches of science disappears with all the rest. It is admitted, of course, that we can no more create matter than we can mind ; and we can influence mind in a way altogether analogous to our power of modulating matter. By means of the properties of matter we can form instruments, machines, and figures. So, by availing ourselves of the properties of mind, *we can affect the intellectual faculties—exercising them, training them, improving them, producing, as it were, new forms of the understanding.* Nor is there a greater difference between the mass of rude iron from which we make steel, and the thousands of watch-springs into which that steel is cut, or the chronometer which we form of this and other masses equally inert—than there is between the untutored indocile faculties of a rustic, who has grown up to manhood without education, and the skill of the artist who invented that chrono-

meter, and of the mathematician who uses it to trace the motions of the heavenly bodies.”

I do not wish to strain an inference from this passage in favour of the congeniality of matter and mind and their probable identity; but it certainly does strike me that the fact as stated, and stated correctly, tends in some degree to shew that the mind, immaterial though it may be, as contended by the Noble Writer, can boast very little superiority in what may be called its *native* state, and before the successful cultivation of education has created the powers which are so eloquently and justly described.\*

\* If minds, contrary to the notion of some of the old Immaterialists, have not pre-existed and been ready for use and annexation to their destined bodies—and been taken *quasi* from a magazine of minds from time to time when the proper moment *in* time arrived; if they are really generated or created *pro re nata*, each for its respective and corresponding body—and if, on its creation or production into existence, by whatever mode, and as an immaterial being,

Another and important subject connected with the main topic of "Immaterial mind," namely, the *instincts* of animals, is observed upon by his Lordship in this section—"These," says his Lordship, (page 73), "are unquestionably *mental* faculties which we discover by observation and *consciousness*, but which are themselves wholly *unconnected with any exercise* of reason." Now this passage is not unaccompanied with difficulties—*mental* must mean belonging to *mind*—mind he has treated as *immaterial*, and as "the *sentient* principle"—as the *separate* from body—and with a *oneness* and *singleness*—and possessing that *indescryptibility* that results from a *perfectly simple* and *uncompounded substance* (all which are considered by the advocates of *Immaterialism* essential to the mind), it certainly does add greatly to the difficulty of this inquiry to reconcile all this "modulation," this improvement by education—by exercise—by training—producing as it were, "*new forms of understanding*," in a word, all this change and modification with or upon a "monad," an "indivisible," "simple," "uncompounded," "indescryptible," "*unchangeable*," substance!

agent in all the great operations which raise mind, in his estimate, *above* body, however organized. He says, “ we discover these *instincts* in ourselves, and that too by *consciousness*,” i. e. by that faculty which, he says, proves to us the existence of mind “ a being *different from our bodies*, i. e. ‘*immaterial*,’ with a degree of evidence higher than any we can have for the existence of bodies themselves,” and yet his Lordship says that these *instincts*—these *mental* faculties, are themselves wholly unconnected with any exercise of *reason*!

Is there no *inconsistency*, no contradiction in terms in this doctrine? Is the immaterial mind such that *instincts* are *mental* qualities—and yet there is in these mental qualities *nothing* connected with *any* exercise of *reason*? the great distinguishing faculty which separates *mind* from *matter*? Is man with his immaterial mind, governed as well by *instinct* as by the reasoning power? Is that



proudest faculty which places *mind* in the *Immaterialist's* opinion far above inert and senseless *matter*, yet so inadequate to the government of the *whole* human animal, that its power must be helped out by that *instinct* given by the Creator to the mere animal clod—the very lowest of the brute creation? But again; *instinct* is a *mental* quality—the brute has *instinct*—then the brute has *mind*.—Does his Lordship by the word *mind*, applied to the brute animal, possessing the *mental* qualities, understand the same species of *mind*—the *immaterial* mind which invests MAN with those powers over creation, that makes him almost literally the *lord* of nature! If he does *not*, *what* is the substance and essence of *that* mind *which* he gives to man? and that with which he also dignifies *the brute*? A definition here, at least, of the word MIND is essential in his reasoning, and to our comprehension of it. Will he at last acknow-

ledge that these difficulties render it somewhat more doubtful than he has hitherto admitted it to be—that *matter*, and what he calls *mind*, *may be* congenial? and that it cannot be *yet* safely denied that the *instincts* and the *reasonings* of the *man* and of the *brute* *may possibly* have the same material origin—and differ only in degree, not specie; both having such a portion of each, as the Almighty Creator hath thought proper to bestow on them respectively?

I cannot myself find my way out of these difficulties—nor does his Lordship, in any part of his work, help to extricate us.—Every thing which he says on this head of *instinct*, rather increases the difficulty when collated with the doctrine he contends for—that *man* and the animals which we designate irrational and *brute*, are *psychologically different*—though *both* have animal *instincts* and apparently the *same species* of reasoning faculty, but differing in

degree. All this surely increases the difficulty we are under, when called on to answer peremptorily to the question—"is the skill of the bee, and the beaver, and the ant, the sagacity of the elephant, the affection, fidelity, and the memory of the dog—are ALL these the results of material organization with instinct superadded—or, have they, like man, the *mens divini*—the immortal and immaterial and *indestructible* mind,\* in which man rejoices?" or, "is man like them, an organized system of matter, with a sufficient addition of instinct added by his Maker to fit him for his allotted functions?"

But whatever may become of the question of the immateriality of the human soul—or of the nature of the instinct and partial

\* The great argument for the Immateriality of the Mind is that matter is destructible—i. e. its organization—and therefore they reason that *mind*, which they assume to be immortal, must be *immaterial*—i. e. not organized and indestructible.

reason of the brute, in one opinion, happily, all the phenomena we know or witness lead us to concur—namely,—that both man and the whole animal creation are “so fearfully and wonderfully made,” that in their *whole* being, and in every part of it, bodily and mentally, they are manifestly the work of a wise, a designing, an almighty, and beneficent MIND! In this result of his Lordship’s reasoning by induction to prove this fundamental truth of Natural Theology, every reasonable inquirer must concur:—though there are many, I apprehend, who may hesitate to adopt what I conceive must be his Lordship’s ultimate conclusion, (reasoning in the way he does to prove the mind immaterial)—and that is, “that nothing *material* can be susceptible of having communicated to it by Omnipotence itself, the capabilities of producing those mental phenomena which the mind of man does actually exhibit.”

On the whole of what occurs in the Discourse on this head of *instinct*, I am sorry to say, I find nothing as to the subject of mind, that at all adds to our knowledge of it.—It throws no new light on this interesting topic—his Lordship makes no progress towards ascertaining by any new argument grounded on facts already known—or by any new inductive experiment, the limit which divides Instinct from Reason.—On the contrary he seems to give up all hope on that head, and to admit the impossibility of success even in one of the most obvious and familiar instances. This appears from the following passage which contains a remarkable acknowledgment of the imperfect state of our knowledge, and the hopelessness of adding to it by any efforts of our reasoning powers, though the subject be one which lies most obvious to our experiment—one which is hourly under our observation, and which would appear much more within

the reach of our sagacity and reasoning faculties than that upon which we are so inclined to pronounce dogmatically—the nature and essence of the human soul.—This passage is in page 74 of the Discourse—“So allowing that the brutes exercise but very rarely and in a limited extent the reasoning powers, *it seems impossible to distinguish from the operations of reason*, those instances of sagacity which some dogs exhibit in obeying the directions of their masters—and indeed, generally, the *docility* shewn by them and *other animals*.—*These are different from the operations of instinct*, because they are acts which vary with circumstances, novel and unexpectedly varying.”\*

Passing now from the 3rd section, in

\* Instinct—its nature and source—its extent, admitted on all hands to be almost commensurate, though in different degrees, with all animated existence—but, above all, the exact limit which separates it from faculties properly intellectual, have been subjects of discussion in nearly all works

which the "Discourse" treats on the *immateriality* of mind, as a proof of *design* in the Creator—and passing from it, if I mistake not, without feeling any very strong impression made in favour of its immateriality—we come now to the *fifth* section, (p. 98) which his Lordship designates, the "Psychological argument, or Evidence of the Deity's designs, drawn from the nature of the mind—or which treats of the probable designs of the Deity with respect to the future destiny of his creatures." This second branch, he says, like the first, rests upon the same foundation with all the other inductive sciences, differing only in this, that the one belongs to the inductive science of *Natural* and *Mental*, and the other to the inductive science of *Moral* Philosophy. He states, that the means which we have of investigating the probable designs of the that have treated on physiology or psychology—but with no better success than his Lordship.

Deity as to the soul, are derived from two sources, the nature of the *human mind* and the *attributes* of the Creator. He then proceeds to the consideration of these—and so far as his reasoning on them is founded on any facts which can rightly and safely be made the subject matter of Induction by being clear and ascertained, he is, no doubt, proceeding rightly, and in the legitimate and proper course of extending the limits of Natural Theology. Some preliminary observations on this subject, however, are made by his Lordship, in p. 99, which, to me at least, appearing somewhat obscure, I therefore pass them, and come to one in which he admits, that, in treating of this branch of his subject, he is under the necessity of entering more at large into the Deity's designs in regard to the soul, especially those to be inferred from its constitution, than he had theretofore done.

It is in this 5th section that we are to look



for the true scope, and full force of his Lordship's reasoning on the main subject of his treatise; and, as I am most anxious that I should neither be in error myself, nor mislead others with respect to it—I shall, therefore, endeavour to give the arguments on which he supports the immateriality of the mind, with as much exactness as I can, with such observations as each may suggest in answer.

The questions, then, are, as expressly raised by his Lordship—

1st.—What is the *Nature* of the *Human Soul*?—and

2nd.—What are the Attributes of the Deity?

It is the *first* question only that need be adverted to here, as no controversy arises on the second.

Now, in thus constructing the inquiry, he makes the nature and constitution—the *materiality*, or *immateriality* of the soul, a

direct question; no doubt in order that, when ascertained, he may take and avail himself of the proved fact, as one of those on which, by the inductive method, he may arrive at the knowledge sought, namely, the designs of the Creator as to the future state of the soul. This *mode* of inquiry seems perfectly fair, and a just application of the inductive method to this question of Natural Theology,—with the exception of the doubt already observed upon—as to the necessity, the propriety, or prudence of introducing at all into the discussion the nature and essence of the soul: that part of the subject, however, has been discussed. The Immateriality of the Mind then, having been made a direct question—we are now to see how it is dealt with.

It must be observed that, in order to conduct an inquiry into this subject rightly, the facts, which are to be the subject matter of induction, should be ascertained with

as much certainty as a *philosophic* inquiry requires. Either, then, the question of the immateriality of the soul must be taken as proved by some previous investigation and decision, reasonably settling that question ; or, the writer should in this work, himself enter on the inquiry in a spirit of perfect impartiality, unswayed by a previous opinion, or hypothesis, and should settle it between himself and the reader, by satisfactory and convincing proofs, both sides of the case being fairly considered—for, *until thus settled, it cannot be the foundation or materials for any inductive proof.*

When it should have been ascertained *what* the nature of the soul really was, the question then to arise would be, what inference could be fairly drawn by the Natural Theologist, *from that established fact*, with respect to the intention of the Deity as to the future state of the soul, regard being had to his attributes. But, instead of that

course, what is done in the “ Discourse ? ” The first proposition in this section, is, not an argument, nor a proposition, that the nature of the soul is such or such—but one peremptorily and *dogmatically announcing that the intent of the Deity rests on, and is governed by the immaterial or material nature of the soul*—that the immateriality or materiality of it, would be conclusive of its future state—that, if *immaterial*, it shall survive the body—if *material*, its destruction, along with that of the body, follows as a necessary consequence : and his Lordship states that it is so, on this reasoning—viz. that, as by the theory of materialism, the soul belongs to the *particular arrangement* of the matter of the body, not to *matter itself*, therefore the destruction of the organization must destroy the soul which consists in it. This, certainly, is very dogmatic theology :—and with the most sincere respect for learning so extensive as his Lordship’s, but not having yet been able to decide, whether the soul is

immaterial, or not, I must, for the present, dissent from so damnatory and annihilating a doctrine. His Lordship says, that “ALL the doctrines make the immateriality of the soul their foundation of its future state.”—It would have been satisfactory to have had some reference to those doctrines, that we might learn upon what they are based, and be enabled to judge of their reasonableness. This is denied to us. But, whatever authority they may repose on, they, at all events, are not the doctrines of Christianity, for, happily, in the Christian creed there is no such denunciation !

His Lordship appears to have decided on this branch of the inquiry which he instituted as Natural Theologian, rather hastily, and, I think, with *malice prepense* against the *material* mind—for we have no reasoning—no steps in the progress towards this summary and sudden sentence of annihilation, made on the metaphysical ground of the soul's materiality.—It has all the ap-

pearance of being the decision of a partisan judge, pronouncing judgment without either hearing counsel, or even consulting authorities himself.

I admit freely, that the Christian creed cannot be set up in a discussion on Natural Theology, as a countervailing authority ; yet surely in a Christian land it must have *some* weight in leading a reasoner to *doubt*, until *proof* be offered, whether such a denunciation be of any value ; whether his Lordship has *rightly* inferred that it is the will, design, and decree of the Almighty, that the material soul shall perish everlastingly ; or— if that mode of putting the question in debate be objectionable, whether the human mind be really so constituted as to be in danger of this annihilation, or *ceasing to be*, from the *materiality* of its substance. His Lordship, indeed, asserts strenuously, that the human mind is not *so* constituted ;

for he argues, that the mind must be *immaterial*, and therefore adopts the safe side of this question. However, in pity to those who may unfortunately think it *possible* that the soul *may be* material, and that, therefore, according to him the present life is the “be all and the end all;” it must be recollected that to them it is no trifling inquiry whether his Lordship’s arguments do or do not conclusively support his doctrine. Let us, therefore, examine on what grounds he contends for its *immateriality*. His arguments as I collect them, are these:—and he alleges they result from experience.

1st. “That if a particular combination of matter *gives birth* to mind, the operation is peculiar and singular; that we have no instance of the combination of certain elements producing anything quite different from the *ingredients*, and *also* from the *compound substance*; and that, therefore, as the materialists maintain, that by matter being

arranged, in a particular way, there is *an organized body* produced, and also *something different*, namely, *mind*, having not one of its properties ; therefore, the case of the materialists is contradicted by the plain dictates of experience, and that the evidence for MIND is complete in itself, *consciousness* being the evidence of it."

And he exemplifies the argument, by showing, that if two bodies, an *acid* and an *alkali* be mixed, they make a kind of body possessing qualities of its own, different from the properties of each and the other *two* ; but that here there are not two *different* existences, viz. the neutral salt composed of the acid and the alkali, and another thing different from that neutral salt, and engendered for the first time by that salt coming into existence. And he also exemplifies by the bust new chiselled into something different from the block, &c.

2nd. His next argument is, that the existence and operations of mind, (i. e. *im-*



*material* mind,) if supposed, accounts for all the phenomena of matter, (i. e. he supposes the *hypothesis*,) and he assumes also, that, if true, it would explain certain facts.

3rd. He then argues, that *matter* cannot account for *phenomena of mind*.

4th. His next argument is, that no effect produced by material agency ever produced a *spirit*, but that we cannot doubt the evidence of *consciousness* as to soul.

And, finally, for those reasons he contends, that we have a *strict induction of facts* to warrant the conclusion that *mind* is different from *matter*.

The short result of his arguments stands thus :—1. *Mind* derived from *matter* is unprecedented ; because, if mind be from an arrangement of matter, or as his Lordship has it, if matter gives *birth* to mind, *mind* is a *something* different from the *matter* that produced it by organization. 2. *Mind* is evidenced completely by consciousness. 3. *Mind* accounts for all the *phenomena* of

matter. 4. *Matter* cannot account for phenomena of mind. (p. 106.) 5. No effects of material agency ever produced *spirit*.

To these several arguments the short answers following are obvious, and show, it is hoped, that his Lordship's reasoning is inconclusive.

1st. The argument is right in assuming that the *mind*, the thinking matter either as produced *from* matter or *with it*, as it is in man, is unprecedented ; there is nothing similar to the existence of man in nature, unless a similarity be found in those animals which have *mind* like man, but in a lower degree ; for he admits *mental* qualities in those, i. e. *mind* and *reason* to a certain extent.\* But if *man* be *without precedent*, i. e. the human *mind connected* with the body, as it must be confessed it is, it follows only that he is *sui generis*—but this does not in any degree affect the question whether mind *be* or *be not* material.

\* See page 74 of the Discourse.

There is a fallacy, perhaps, in stating that *matter* gives *birth* to mind. It is not admitted that matter, quâ matter, *gives birth* to mind, but that what both parties call *mind*—i. e. *whatever it is that thinks*, reasons, &c. has, by the will of the Creator, been produced *according to an established law*—(i. e. procreation.) He has not thought proper to reveal *how*, or of *what materials* or substance he has ordained that they should be produced—that is for *psychology* to discover, and the question now presses as much upon his Lordship as on the Materialist—for his answer is, that the objection may be retorted; and that whether mind be material or immaterial, equal difficulties arise; there being no instance but man in which matter is connected with, or, if it please better, *gives birth* to an *immaterial* soul; experience gives no other example of this union or connection, or birth, but man.

If the *Immaterialists* answer that it is

the will of the Deity that such a generation or combination, &c., should exist of *immaterial* mind with a *material body*, the Materialists may also recur to the power and will of the Deity, to combine and connect material substance with THAT, whatever it be, which thinks, &c.

The examples of the chemist mixing his ingredients, and the statuary educing a figure from marble, &c. do not apply, because in those cases things are disposed of by other natural or physical laws, different from that by which the body and mind of man are produced—that distinct law of nature to which only, the *birth*, &c. of man and his mind are attributable.

This instance of the chemical mixture, however, is quite consistent with the argument of the Materialists ; for his Lordship admits, that by the mixture, a third body is produced “ possessing qualities of its own, *different* from those of the original ingredients.” Now all that is sought by the Ma-

terialists is, that certain qualities, *different from those of body unorganized*, should be produced by *organization*; and instead of contending that the species of *mind* produced by the organization, is different from the matter of the body, they admit that both are *matter*.

But there is another answer. This objection supposes the *mind* to be immaterial; for it says, "*the mind is something different from the matter that produced it, as contended for by organization.*" But the Materialists deny that the *mind* is immaterial; they say it is the result of *organization*, and the will of the Deity. The argument, therefore, don't apply to them. Now it is not contradicted by the Immaterialists, that organization does produce a certain degree of *mind*—i. e. *reasoning* faculty, for animals of the brute kind have instincts, and instincts are admitted to have *mental* qualities connected with their *reason* to a certain degree; and it is not contended by the Immaterialists, that brutes have an im-

material mind.—As to the mind being “evidenced by *consciousness*”—let it be conceded—but *that* does not include a *conviction*, or *any* proof, that the *mind* is *material*, or *immaterial*.

2nd. “*Mind* accounts for the phenomena of matter.”—What is meant by *MIND* in this objection?—Is it an *immaterial mind*?—If so, it begs the main question, that the mind is immaterial.—If *material*, then there is no question to be settled.—If, by mind is meant merely that which *thinks*, *reasons*, &c. without reference to its being material, or immaterial; then, as the *material* mind falls within the description—the material mind *does* account for the phenomena, and the objection is answered.

3rd. Page 106. “The existence and action of matter, vary it how we will, cannot account for the phenomena of mind.” This, I presume, must mean that a material mind cannot account for those pheno-

mena. But can the mind of man, whether material or immaterial, do so ; and if not, if the immaterial mind cannot account for those phenomena, there is no weight in the objection ; it is retorted. If it *can* do so, there is still no weight in the objection—unless it be *assumed* that the mind is *immaterial*.

4th. “ No effect of material agency produces *spirit*.” This is also an *assumption*, if by spirit is meant the *mind of man* ; for, if it be not assumed that the *mind* in a man born is not spirit—spirit is produced by procreation in the usual way of human birth. If the objection be that *no other spirit than the mind of man is produced* by natural agency, it affects not the question.

If these answers be admitted to apply to his Lordship’s arguments, as stated, he is unfounded in the inference he draws, (107). “ That he has evidence of the strictest kind,” or of any kind, to justify the conclu-

sion "that the *mind* is different and independent of matter altogether."

With the rest of his argument to prove the strongest probability in favour of the mind surviving the body, I do not deal. I am persuaded from the evidences, or by the probabilities which Natural Theology holds out, and from the attributes of the Deity, and also from Revelation, happily concurring, that the mind shall live hereafter; nay, that body and mind shall exist together in a future state, and it is *because* I think so that I have ventured to blame the introduction into this Discourse of this disputed question of the *immateriality* of the mind—which tends to lessen the probability of a future life, by confining all the proofs of Natural Theology in support of it to the one alternative—*that of the mind's IMMATERIALITY*, as well as because it is directly opposed to revealed religion.

It is now, perhaps, that the inconve-



niences of introducing this topic most clearly appear; for what is the present state of the argument on this subject? His Lordship's design, as professed in the fifth section, was to adduce evidence of the design of the Deity, as regards the soul, from the nature of mind and the attributes of the Deity. In order to shew what the design was, he assumes that the future state of the soul as to its existence after the death of the body depended on its *immateriality*; and he then inquires, or rather assumes that is immaterial. If he succeeded in *proving* it immaterial, he then would have had a *fact* for inductive science to prove its immortality upon his assumed doctrine—but if the result of his argument had the contrary effect, he would then *actually have proved* the negative of the position he contends for—namely, that it could *not* survive the body. He placed the whole question on the decision of that single point.—If he had not thus framed the question—

but had endeavoured to derive from any, or all other sources, whatever they might furnish, to shew that the intention of the Deity was, that man should live hereafter, he would certainly have a wider field and a greater probability of making out *that* case than he can at present. Now, therefore, it may reasonably be asked, what could have been the motive for narrowing the question, and making the materiality of the soul a negative on its immortality? It must clearly have been because the *immateriality* of the soul was a fixed opinion of his—his *favourite hypothesis*, and *therefore* he unnecessarily and with design assumed as his hypothesis, in the first instance, that the soul is *immaterial*, and afterwards sought out arguments to prove that hypothesis—and with his mind under the influence of it, he is led in argument to violate the positive and express rule laid down by himself as the fundamental rule to govern inductive science—namely,

“ That no hypothesis shall be admitted—that nothing shall be assumed merely because, if true, it would explain the facts.”

Page 106.

In addition to the arguments of his Lordship, which I have just adverted to as tending to prove the immateriality of the soul, there are a few others, not calling for any particular attention—one as an instance, page 110, “ the material world affords no example of *creation* any more than of *annihilation*—but of *mind*, (what mind? material or immaterial?) this cannot be said; *it is called into existence perpetually before our eyes.*” How—but by the agency of matter—the law of generation?—Again—“ the mind’s independence of matter is shewn (he says) *by the dissimilarity of its constitution—the inconceivable rapidity of its operation?*”—and he refers to “ *Dreams*, as throwing a strong light on the subject, and *seeming* to demonstrate the *possible* disconnection of mind and matter.”

His Lordship gives a short dissertation on dreaming, containing statements not a little improbable but which are at all events incapable of proof to make them fit subjects for induction.—Dreaming itself certainly is an operation of the mind, or the *brain*, highly interesting, but one to which most unaccountably psychologists have hitherto paid scarcely any attention, and it remains, therefore, a topic very little productive of *useful* argument. I, therefore, dismiss these last-mentioned arguments of his Lordship, without further observation, and come to that which he calls “the *strongest of all arguments both for the separate existence of mind, and for its surviving the body.*” That it may have its full weight, I lay the whole of it before the reader, praying his particular and minute attention to it, as exhibiting (for so it certainly does, to my understanding) the best and most striking example of the fallacy and inconclusiveness of the reasoning, on which

the immateriality of the soul has been rested : it is found in page 121 :—

“ The strongest of all the arguments both for the separate existence of mind, and for its surviving the body remains, and it is drawn from the strictest induction of facts. The body is constantly undergoing change in all its parts. Probably no person at the age of twenty has one single particle in any part of his body which he had at ten ; and still less does any portion of the body he was born with continue to exist in or with him. All that he before had has now entered into new combinations, forming parts of other men, or of animals, or of vegetable or mineral substances, exactly as the body he now has will afterwards be resolved into new combinations after his death. *Yet the mind continues one and the same, ‘ without change or shadow of turning.’ None of its parts can be resolved; for it is one and single, and it remains unchanged by the changes of*

the body. The argument would be quite as strong though the change undergone by the body were admitted not to be so complete, and though some small portion of its harder parts were supposed to continue with us through life."

" But observe how strong the inferences arising from these facts are, both to prove that the existence of the mind is entirely independent of the existence of the body, and to show the probability of its surviving! If the mind continues the same, while all or nearly all the body is changed, it follows that the existence of the mind depends not in the least degree upon the existence of the body; for it has already *survived a total change of*, or, in the common use of the words, an *entire destruction of that body*. But again, if the strongest argument to shew that the mind perishes with the body, nay, the only argument be, as it indubitably is, derived from the phe-

nomena of death, the fact to which we have been referring affords an answer to this. For the argument is that we know of no instance in which the mind has ever been known to exist after the death of the body. Now here is exactly the instance desiderated, it being manifest that the same process which takes place on the body more suddenly at death is taking place more gradually, but as effectually in the result, during the whole of life, and that death itself does not more completely resolve the body into its elements and form into new combinations than living fifteen or twenty years destroy, by like resolution and combination, the self-same body. And yet after those years have elapsed, and the former body has been dissipated and formed into new combinations, the mind remains the same as before, exercising the same memory and consciousness, and so preserving the same personal identity, as if the

body had suffered no change at all. In short, it is not more correct to say that all of us who are now living have bodies formed of what were once the bodies of those who went before us, than it is to say that some of us who are now living at the age of fifty have bodies which in part belonged to others now living at that and other ages. The phenomena are precisely the same, and the operations are performed in like manner though with different degrees of expedition. *Now all would believe in the separate existence of the soul, if they had experience of its existing APART from the body.* But the facts referred to *prove that it does exist apart from one body* with which it once was united, and though it is in union with another, yet as it is not adherent to the same, it is shewn to have an existence separate from, and independent of, that body. So *all* would believe in the soul surviving the body, if after the body's



death its existence were made manifest. But the facts referred to prove that after the body's death, that is, after the chronic dissolution which the body undergoes during life, the mind continues to exist as before. Here, then, we have that proof so much desiderated—the existence of the soul after the dissolution of the bodily frame with which it was connected. The two cases cannot, in any soundness of reasoning, be distinguished; and this argument, therefore, one of pure induction, derived partly from physical science, through the evidence of our senses, partly from psychological science by the testimony of our consciousness, appears to prove the possible Immortality of the Soul almost as rigorously as ‘if one were to rise from the dead.’”

There are several observations to be made on this “strongest argument,” in order to exhibit it in its full power to the

reader! To begin with the beginning of this curious and copious extract.

I admit fully the physical fact that in a certain number of years, the materiel of the human body undergoes a total change—and that this materiel becomes part of other bodies. The next proposition which occurs in the argument is—"Yet, (says his Lordship) the *mind* continues *one* and **THE SAME.**" Now this is a naked assumption—for if the mind be the result of material organization, it is enough to say that this is *not self-evident*, and it is *not proved*. I may add, for the present purpose, nor is it *proveable*—for in no part of his Lordship's discourse is there any *proof* whatever of it. But let us see what is the kind of *identity* meant by the Noble Writer, when he says it continues "the same."

Is it that it continues to subsist of the *same material*? The hypothesis is that it is *immaterial*. Is it that it continues the same

in *state*, or in *act*, or *qualities*? From infancy to youth, from youth to manhood and old age, the state of the mind as to degree varies in all its qualities for the better or the worse. If the essence of the mind be in thought, feeling, passion, volition, &c. ALL are perpetually in change. If *disease* intervenes, it always varies, sometimes annihilates the mental powers. For all this, indeed, we have his Lordship's express authority, fully sufficient for the purpose of this argument, for (119) he states—  
 “ it (the mind) undergoes important changes, both in the progress of time, and by means of exercise and culture, the developement of the bodily powers appears to affect it, and so does their decay; but we ought rather to say that in ordinary cases, its improvement is contemporaneous with the growth of the body, and its decline generally is contemporaneous with that of the body after an advanced period of life.”

Again, it is asserted—"none of its parts can be resolved, for it is one and single." How is *that* proved? Is not this another assumption? Is it not part and parcel of the very thing in dispute, namely, whether the mind be immaterial, or, *being material*, may *have parts*? Would it not be equally logical, and, for ought that appears, equally true in point of fact to allege that the mind in all its states varies with the body, grows with its growth and strengthens with its strength, sympathises with it in all its mutations, in sickness, in health, in joy and sorrow, in pleasure and in pain? and that their perfect identity is as lasting as their union is inseparable, previous to their supposed final severance or dissolution by natural or accidental death? And, in a word — is not the whole of this final, and as his Lordship seems to reckon it, *conclusive* argument, based solely on those numerous *assump-*

tions? His Lordship goes on in this 'strongest proof' to his inference, and says, "if the mind continues the *same*, while all or nearly all the body is changed, it *follows* that the *existence of the mind* depends not in the *least degree* upon the *existence of the body!*" (never surely was a more startling proposition rested on an *if!*) for, says his Lordship, "it has already *survived* a total change of, or, in the *common use of the words*, an entire DESTRUCTION of the body." In a reconsideration of this passage, had his Lordship had leisure to reconsider it, I cannot help believing he would either qualify or retract it; for surely it must be obvious to such an understanding as his, that the whole force of the argument rests on the use which is made of the word *body*,—one in this instance clearly equivocal. When it is, in the foregoing extract, admitted, "that all would believe in the separate existence of the soul if they had experience of its existing apart from the body," his Lordship

could not, surely, understand thereby the existence of the mind of a living organized man apart from those particles which in the course of time had passed away from the *living organized body*. The meaning and amount of the admission stated in this extract, page 123, “that all would believe in the separate existence of the soul if they had experience of its existing apart from the body,” must refer not to the particles which at one time partly constituted the living *organized body* of a man, and had been changed in the ordinary course of physical nature,—but *to the death* of the *organized man*, the “*body*,”—to a body that by death *had* ceased to be—and that the soul was existing apart afterward,—yet in the way his Lordship uses the concession in argument, he leads the reader to understand it as an admission that if the *mind* of a given man was known to exist apart, not after the *destruction of the life and organ-*

ization of the body, but after certain particles had passed away, leaving a living man, that this would be taken as proof of the existence of mind separate and apart from body.—This is not quite fair—the whole is a sophism, and not a very ingenious one. If, indeed, the *existence of the mind*, apart and separate, were proved to have *survived the death* of the individual to whom it belonged, all argument would be at an end; but who ever could for a moment believe that because a particular individual had grown lusty or lean, and that therefore the materials of the body which constituted, twenty years since, part of his person had been successively changed, *therefore*, though he was yet alive, and his *mind therefore in existence*, and in the usual connexion with the body, the *mind had survived his body, and exhibited full proof of what?—mind existing independent of matter!*—really this is “*too bad*,” even for *meta-*

*physics!* On reading further in this passage, however, we find that this fact of *change of substance* in the yet living body, is really taken by his Lordship in the argument as *tantamount* to *actual death*; for the words are, “now here is exactly the *instance desiderated*, it being manifest that the *same* process which takes place in the body **MORE SUDDENLY** at death, is taking place more gradually, but *as effectually*, in the result during the whole of life—and that *death itself does not more completely resolve the body into its elements, and form it into new combinations, than living fifteen or twenty years does destroy by like resolution and combination the self-same body!*” Marvellous! His Lordship throws the continued organization and unintermitted functions of life, *i. e.* the continued combination of the mind with the living body of the man, entirely overboard! But the “*same process*,” he says, “which takes place at *death*, is taking



place gradually during the whole of life.”—  
 Now what is it that takes place at death?  
 Certainly not a *change of substance* in the  
 body, but a change *from organization to*  
*disorganization*, the *utter destruction of or-*  
*ganization*, in which life consists.—Is this  
 taking place during the whole of *life*, as it  
 does actually in death? One of the sacred  
 writers uses the expression “I *die* daily,” but  
 that was plainly a metaphor; here, however,  
 we are gravely and argumentatively in-  
 formed in a philosophical, nay, a logical  
 treatise, that by living well and cheerily,  
 we are *changing* our bodily substance; which  
 is no doubt true; but it is added, “that *death*  
*which resolves the organized body to its ori-*  
*ginal elements* (but by the way does not  
*change one set of material particles for ano-*  
*ther)* and *terminates life*, does not do this  
 more completely than is done by *that pro-*  
*cess of change which has been taking place ever*  
*since we began to live!*”

According to this mode of logical reasoning, adopted to prove the continued identity of the immaterial mind after successive changes of identity in the body, we may with equal success contend for it that no human creature remains for a single instant the same person—(if sameness of *body* and *mind* constitute it)—for certainly in every instant of our lives there is a change of some portion of the material of which the body is composed—every pulse that beats, every breath we draw, produces such a change ; and according to the doctrine of this argument of his Lordship, by a change of particles there is produced a separation of body and mind ; the paring of a nail, therefore, in his Lordship's sense, would effect momentarily an important change in our personal identity, if consisting in a sameness of body and mind ; unless indeed (and to this his Lordship seems to refer when he contends for it that his argu-

ment would be quite as strong, though the change undergone by the body were admitted not to be *so complete*, and though some *small portion* of its *harder* parts were supposed to continue through life) the question of identity were to be decided on the parliamentary principle—That in every instance the *majority* of remaining particles should carry the identity!

But it would be trifling to observe further upon this extraordinary argument.—I only add that it appears to me inconclusive and perfectly inapplicable in all respects to the point it is produced to establish!

But this argument for the continued sameness of consciousness becomes inconclusive as to the separate and independent existence of mind, from another consideration—for what is consciousness as to this? It can be nothing but a conviction arising from an act of memory, that the mind, remembering *now* what had taken place, or its own

state at a *former time*, feels that it is *now* the same mind that it was *then*. But what was *that* mind formerly and now, admitting its sameness at those two periods? It was and is a being then and now possessing and deriving its only proof of its continued existence—consciousness—from a *material* organization by which only it could or can exercise any power of perception, reasoning, volition, or *memory*; for it will not be denied, that the *brain*, during the co-existence of the soul and body in life, is the necessary organ by which the mind in memory can alone act.\* The fact of *consciousness* then can only be proof of a sameness of mind commensurate with the *union* and continued life of body and soul, or the *union of the material organ, the*

\* The doctrine is not now, I believe, questioned by any physiologist—that, on the parts of the brain, and, in some animals, of the spinal marrow, which are associated with the nerves and muscles of the sensitive system, the MENTAL functions of the brain depend.

*brain, with the mind*; whatever the nature of *this* may be—and, therefore, cannot afford any evidence whatsoever that the mind has a *separate and independent existence* from the body.

The writers for the immateriality of the mind continually refer to this *consciousness* of the mind, for proof of its independent existence and *separate* and *sole* dominion over the body. But all argument from this source appears quite powerless when applied to one who has not adopted the affirmative of that hypothesis, and is not, therefore, under its influence. Let any man, not a metaphysician, one ignorant of the dispute connected with the *immateriality* and separate existence of the mind, be asked for his *consciousness* respecting mind, it will be found that he has not the most remote notion, opinion, or *consciousness* that he consists of *two* parts, mind and body, and that when he uses the pronoun *I*, as

referable to himself, he considers and thinks of himself as one and *indivisible*—the *concrete* person, composed of body and mind, making together an individual thing. He understands nothing of the supposed dominion of *his* mind over *his* body, that the one is master, the other slave—that when he speaks of self, and uses “he” or “I,” he feels, means, or intends his *mind* only; or that when he walks he conceives that his feet are obeying orders only; that the command is given by a thing called *mind*, separate and independent of body, and that the *feet* only comply as in duty bound. The notion of a *consciousness* ascertaining or recognizing a diversity between mind and body, is assuredly known only, if it does really exist at all, in those *minds* which are, perhaps *unconsciously*, swayed by opinions which they have been taught, or have formed upon argument whether well or ill founded.

The reader will pardon yet another word on this same *consciousness*, on which so much is made to rest. Is this consciousness always and necessarily a true and infallible criterion of identity? I, for one, venture to doubt it. It is a feeling, sentiment, or act of the mind, in which the mind itself does not always feel certainty; it is accompanied not unfrequently with a certain doubt respecting the particular fact, event, or by-gone thought, or former state of mind, to which it relates. Its truth depends upon the truth and accuracy of *memory*, one of the least faithful of our mental faculties. But there is this farther argument, or fact rather, bearing strongly against the *veracity* of consciousness. The Noble and Learned Lord has adverted to *dreams* as one source of argument for the immateriality of the mind. I venture to refer to the phenomena of dreams also, to derogate from the universality of the truth and fidelity

of consciousness ; and every reader will concur with me in recollecting numerous instances in which dreaming was accompanied by a thoroughly *false* consciousness. In a dream, how often do we feel conscious of being, or having been, parties in acting and suffering which not only never did but never could take place ? the deception being so great that it prevails in instances and with respect to acts, which from the moral and mental habits, and actual circumstances, of the waking man, never could by possibility occur ; indeed, every dream is more or less, may I not say universally, a cheat upon the mind of the waking man. And so satisfied are we of the little dependency we place on memory, and as to the fallacy of consciousness with respect to past transactions, that when we are taxing recollection for by-gone events, we frequently exclaim, “ Did I really do so and so, or did I only dream it ? ”



If it be said that this only proves what is universally admitted—that the imperfect state of the mental faculties in sleep may affect consciousness, as well as every other act or function of the mind—but that no argument can be derived from thence against the truth of a waking consciousness, the answer is that at least *this* is proved by the phenomena—that just in proportion as the mental faculties are strong or weak, perfect or imperfect, in the same degree may consciousness be true or false, correct or erroneous—and therefore does not furnish the same safe foundation for inductive reasoning to rest upon as the truth of a physical fact, which, by experiment duly made, may be ascertained beyond possible error.\*

\* His Lordship has dwelt more perhaps than the value of them would warrant, upon Dreams, though, as I have mentioned in the text, they are a highly interesting branch of psychological science, and it is to be hoped they may hereafter be made more useful subjects of induction than they

The more one reflects upon this topic, which his Lordshp's work has revived and made interesting—the question of the mind's materiality—the more manifold are the reasons that occur to satisfy that we cannot in our present state solve the question. It is surrounded with difficulties.

at present are. With respect to the object for which the Noble and Learned Lord has introduced them, I strongly incline to the opinion that they rather make against than for the proposition he has undertaken to establish. He refers to them to illustrate, in the first instance, the “inconceivable rapidity of the mind's operations,”—and he doubts not “that this *rapidity* increases in proportion as the interference of the senses;”—that is, the influence of the body “is withdrawn. Dreams,” he says, “throw a strong light upon the subject, and *seem* to demonstrate the possible disconnection of mind and matter.” (111.)

Now the consequence that he would seem to draw by implication from the fact that the mind's operations are more rapid in dreams,—or in proportion as the mind, as he would say, acts alone, disconnected to a certain degree from the body, is, that the mind displays in that situation, more of its native and spiritual energy than when more intimately connected with the clog of matter. If it were really so, one would suppose that those occasional displays of the superior

Had this question been discussed on such principles as would have left unshaken the

power of the *unclogged, immaterial, rational* entity would be in dreams always of this higher and more spiritual nature,—that all the nobler efforts of the reasoning power,—of Genius,—of Imagination,—of the higher Eloquence,—of Poetry, &c.—would be found in Dreams! in fact, that in sleep and dreaming would be found the auspicious season for all mental exertion! How ludicrously opposite to this state of things is the actual fact,—that in dreams the human mind is exhibited in its most pitiable imbecility,—divested almost in every instance of the reasoning faculty,—drivelling from folly to folly, and fallacy to fallacy,—destitute of all that experience and memory furnish to the waking mind, to enable it to steer through the real and actual business of life,—forgetting or confounding all matters of fact,—acting, or believing itself to act, under a *consciousness* as *positive* as it is *false*,—abandoning all the moral guides, and moral and physical principles, which preserve and support it while awake, and therefore when immediately and most intimately and daily connected with the senses.—Such is the state in which mind, “almost disconnected with matter,” displays its helplessness and incapacity for self-government, though, as it is said, it exhibits such “inconceivable rapidity of operation,”—a rapidity which appears, if it really exists, to be rather a proof that it runs riot, when freed by sleep from all the

main doctrine of Christian revelation—that the soul, whatever may be its essence, ma-

sober, mental checks that reason, sound judgment,—a capacity to distinguish the truth of things, and to profit by the lessons of experience, give to the happier and more dignified season, when the *senses* and the *reasoning organ*—the *brain*—then in full activity and vigilance, throw their protection around its pitiable weakness!—Yet see how different a view his Lordship seems to have taken of the state of the mind in sleep. He says (111), “The bodily functions of the mind are in part suspended during sleep, that is, all those which depend on *volition*.” “The consequence of the cessation which takes place of all communication with the senses is, that *the action of the mind*, and, above all, of those powers connected with the *imagination*, becomes much more *vigorous* and *uninterrupted*.” One would almost infer from this *theory*, if it were adopted,—that the *Iliad* must have been composed in a dream, and that the only auspicious position for the Poet—the man of Mind and Fancy—is bed, with opium for his stimulus or his diet! But it is useless to trace this fantastic philosophy of sleep through all the ridiculous consequences to which it would lead us;—it is more useful to inquire whether the very instances which are stated to shew that the mind in dreams acts more *vigorously* of itself than when the senses are awake, do not make against that supposition.—The first instance we have is (112): “The

terial or immaterial, shall have a future and eternal existence, the colour of which

celerity with which any impression upon the *senses* strong enough to be felt without awaking, is caught up and made the ground-work of a new train of ideas." Now this very class of cases shew that the *Mental Faculty*,—this *rapidly-operating, immaterial* mind, in its most happy estate, is obliged to wait upon the senses for the *material* on which it works;—the *sense* suggests the idea to the brain,—and the brain becomes the moving power,—the originator of that thought which furnishes matter for this *celerity* of operation. It is remarkable that every instance given by his Lordship of dreams,—arises from some *sensible* impression;—the mind does not seem to originate, or be capable of doing so, any subject of thought *sua sponte* or *proprio vigore*. The vagaries in which the mind appears to indulge when the fundamental idea is thus caught from the senses, are certainly very amusing, and perhaps totally unaccountable;—but they do not tend to raise the intellectual power or character of the mind,—they are all perfectly irrational, inconsequential, and exhibit the mind in ludicrous nakedness of all strength and power.

With respect to the particular classes of dreams mentioned by his Lordship, two or three observations occur which tend to render it in the highest degree doubtful that they can ever be of use as facts for scientific induction,—at least as at present collected and acted upon. In the first

shall be decided with reference to our conduct in the present state, the question

place, the statement of all dreams must rest on the fidelity and correctness of the individual relator. His Lordship indeed says, that in the dreams which he refers to, the *facts* are numerous,—of *undeniable certainty*, and of daily occurrence. Now I doubt extremely whether were a man to devote himself to the search for *authentic dreams* of any class or description, he could find any single dream so recorded as that it could fairly be said to be of *undeniable certainty* and *exactness*,—or so as to be rightly fitted for scientific induction. He also seems inclined to believe, that *experiments* may be made in dreaming, and that we may have such a collection of them as shall afford precedents or proofs for after times! “Every one knows,” he says, “the effect of a bottle of hot water applied to the soles of the feet.” (112.) This he gives as a kind of approved prescription for producing a certain dream,—and he avers that if the application be made, “you instantly dream of walking over hot mould,—or ashes,—or a stream of *lava*—(in this case the patient must, I presume, have been at Etna, Vesuvius, &c.)—or having burnt your feet by coming too near the fire.”—Again: “So if you fall asleep in a stream of cold air,—or in an open carriage, you will have a most “instructive” dream;—you will, instantly that the wind begins to blow, ‘*dream of the following things*,’” or one of them,—that is to say,—*imprimis*, “that you are on some

would have been a matter of mere metaphysical or psychological curiosity; and

exposed point, and anxious for shelter—but unable to reach it;”—*secundo*, “or you are on the deck of a ship suffering from the gale, and you will run behind a sail for shelter.” Moreover, “the dream will proceed to a change of the wind—and the wind will still blow and you will be driven to the cabin—and then,” *pour comble!* “the ladder is removed—or the door of the cabin will be locked”—but your calamity will not end here, for “you will, presently after, be *on shore*, and in a *house* with *windows*, *all of which will be open*,—you will endeavour to shut them in vain, one after the other; or,” if you escape this long catalogue of horrors, “you will see a *smith's forge*, you will of course be attracted by the fire, and then,” *horresco referens*, “you will have *one hundred pair of bellows*,” neither more nor less, “playing upon it, and extinguish it in an instant; but you will have still to suffer, for the one hundred pair of bellows in blowing out the fire, will fill the whole smithy with their blast, till you are as cold as on the road.” “But, (unhappy sufferer!) this is not all—for, most probably, you will, from time to time, awake, and then you shall fall to sleep again, and the same course of dreaming will succeed in the *greatest variety of changes* that can be rung on your thoughts!”

To prove still more demonstrably the *rapidity* of the changes of the ideas in sleep—his Lordship suggests ano-

would in no way affect the hopes, fears, or feelings, moral or religious, of society,

ther experiment, viz.—“ Let any one sit up all night, and sleep none next day—let him begin to dictate—he will find himself falling asleep after uttering a few words—he will be awakened by the person who writes, repeating the last word, to shew that he has written the whole—the sleeper will at first find it quite impossible to believe *that he has not been asleep for hours*, and will chide the amanuensis for having fallen asleep over his work—*so great, apparently, will be the length of the dream* which he has dreamt, *extending through half a life time*. This experiment is easily tried.”—“ The great probability is that not a single second has been past in sleep.” This is *very* strong—much too strong for ordinary credence—but the next experiment is still more so to prove the same thing—the *velocity* of thought. “ A *puncture* made will immediately produce a *long* dream, which will seem to terminate in some such accident as that—the sleeper has been *wandering in a wood, received a wound from a spear*—or the *tooth of a wild animal*, which at the same time awakens him.” It is not apparent whether his Lordship states these romantic and “ *instructive*” dreams from his own particular experience. If he does, we cannot in courtesy refuse our assent—but if *not*, it might be worthy the consideration of that very learned body, the Royal Society—or that of the Society for “ *Diffusing useful*



or of any individual. It would then have remained a matter of no moment, whe-

Knowledge," whether they should not cause experiments to be made by the best dreamers that can be found, to corroborate those extraordinary statements, and ascertain the practicability of thus dreaming "according to order," or "by particular desire." If large *premiums* be given to the *successful* candidate, no doubt something like this may be done—but, for myself, I do most potently believe, that, if no premium tempt the dreamer, no sleeper will produce a single dream according to his Lordship's "*pattern*"! I do not know whether the cautious, or the credulous, reader will think these tales are made the *more* or the *less* credible by his being informed in a note, annexed to this passage (115), that "the Eastern Tale, in the Spectator, of the *Magician*, who made the Prince plunge his head into a pail of water, is founded on FACTS *like those* to which his Lordship has been referring!"

There is an inference drawn by his Lordship from the statements he makes, to which it seems equally difficult to give unqualified assent as to the statements themselves. He says (117), "There seems every reason to conclude from these facts, that we only dream during *the instant of transition into and out of sleep*. That *instant* is quite enough to account for the whole of what appears a night's dream." No doubt it is so—if the tale from which the inference is made be strictly true—but both will probably

ther this problem should or should not be ever solved, or the contingent truth made

be taken by a cautious man to "require confirmation." Indeed, all that has been stated on this subject, of Dreaming, is such as is not likely to recommend Dreams, as at *present cultivated*, as a safe source of *facts* for *inductive* reasoning to extend science.—Are the other branches of *psychology* much more safe for that purpose?

Though the *extraordinary* instances of the dreaming power may, in the estimation of some, derogate from the character of that mode of collecting *Inductive Facts*, yet there can be no question that certain phenomena of dreaming might be collected by observers of those phenomena, who should be free from the influence of preconceived opinions, and not attached to any hypothesis; from facts or phenomena so collected, valuable accessions of certain knowledge in psychology might eventually be obtained;—for instance—

I think the following facts are already admitted, by general consent, to have been ascertained with respect to Dreams:—

1. That they are all conversant about ideas received in the ordinary way through the senses, or that they are combinations of such ideas, together with ideas produced from such combinations by Reflection; and that there has not been and cannot be, in any dream, any idea but such as fall within this description. In fact, if such an

certain. But is it a matter of such indifference when the question is discussed in its

idea were conceivable, no language could be found to express it.

2. That the Brain is the organ through or by which the idea in dreaming, becomes an object of the mind's contemplation—and that, accordingly, the state of the Brain always produces some modification of the idea dreamt of. Insanity, Delirium, Intoxication in all its stages, disease of any kind affecting that organ, occasions or affects the idea dreamt of. Even when the Brain is only affected in a secondary way—as through the medium of the stomach—the same result follows.

3. That the dream is *frequently*, though it has not been proved to be *always*, created or produced by causes extrinsic to the body: and that a dream not produced by such extrinsic cause, is, in its progress, affected by, altered, or directed by such extrinsic causes.

4. That the power of *volition* is excited in the mind by extrinsic causes during the progress of a dream, and without the dreamer being awakened by the operation of that cause. This is a more easily tried experiment than some of his Lordship's, for it is produced by some by-stander placing, during a dream, a limb of the sleeper in a painful or uneasy position, which the dreamer will, by an act of volition, change.

5. In *all* dreams the mind can operate only through the

present form ? and when the decision of it one way—namely—in favour of the *mate-*

brain—for if the dream be remembered (and we can notice only such) the ideas which are remembered, are so through the *agency of the brain*. This is further proved by the dreaming mind operating on the fancy or will, and through them producing the ordinary effects of passion or volition in the person as on a waking man.

These are, I think, ascertained facts connected with dreams ; there may be others which do not occur to me on the moment. These, it would seem, may be the subject of *induction*, through which to discover other facts connected with dreams at present not discovered or attended to. There are, however, a multitude of detached facts and questions connected with dreams, and those, too, of a very singular and interesting kind, which have not been so generally noticed as to enable us to derive any inference from them, as they affect the nature or modes of operation of the mind in sleep. Instance—the fact that *some* of the mental faculties are active in the dream, while others seem to be quite suspended, and in no way co-operating with the others ; others there are which sometimes are partially active, but imperfectly so.—Judgment and memory afford instances of each class. Attention to this branch of psychology may, in time, undoubtedly add largely to the present stock of knowledge connected with it ; but there will always exist great difficulties in finding, accurately, the facts

*riality* of the soul—not weakens merely our hope of immortality, but annuls that hope

of each particular case, through an intelligent, disinterested, and trustworthy channel. I have known, myself, one person in whose correctness and truth as a relator I would place as much confidence as in my own, who has been habitually accustomed to communicate to me his dreaming experience, and he certainly has had an experience in that way which, I presume, his Lordship would consider quite favourable to the doctrine he adopts in mental philosophy, and which I acknowledge has often puzzled, though it did not persuade or satisfy me. The following might be taken as the result of his experience in this subject.

1. His dreams, which are nightly and numerous, never have the least connection with, or resemblance to, the affairs, events, or business of the preceding day, or those in which he happens at the period to be occupied. They do not even participate in the general tone or temper of his mind—sad or cheerful—gay or melancholy—in the preceding day.

2. He has habitually experienced that *false* consciousness adverted to in a preceding part of these observations ; a firm persuasion that he has known and recollected and was conscious of acts which not only never did occur, but, from his general temperament, character, &c. never could have occurred so long as his mind retained its present character.

totally—and tends to shake to its foundation, the whole Christian system ?

3. He has composed poetry during sleep, which he never did, nor had the least tendency to do, in his waking hours ; and has awoke after delivering a speech, or considerable portion of one, much beyond any estimate he had ever made of his capability while awake.

4. In one instance, in a conversation between him and some others, in a dream, an answer was made by one of the parties in the French language, to an observation of his, in which a certain word was used that he was persuaded he had never before known. On awaking, the expression being yet fresh in his memory, and feeling a full assurance he had never heard the word, he recurred to a dictionary of the language, and found it, but that it was obsolete in the sense in which it had been so used.

5. In dreaming it would sometimes become necessary to read, or to write, but in no instance was he able to distinguish any of the figures or letters minutely, so as to enable him to do either ; and yet so suspended was memory in these instances, that it never occurred to him that this incapacity to read was a proof that he was then dreaming, and that he had often before been so embarrassed.

In several of the instances now mentioned, the operations of the mind are very difficult to be accounted for on any hypothesis. Could we obtain continued and *faithful* accounts of the operations of the minds of others in circum-

It may be said, that establishing the immateriality of the soul, adds a new argument in favour of the doctrine of Revelation—and answers one of the strongest objections that have been urged against it. Admit this to be true, *if* the Immaterialist could establish his main proposition and put an end to doubt and question upon it:—but *if* he does not so establish it—if he leaves it still doubtful—or perhaps by unsound or inconclusive reasoning should increase the doubt that previously existed,—then the result of his labour is, that by placing the hope or, I should say, the *possibility* of a future existence, on the issue of the doubtful metaphysical question, whether the soul be or be not material—he involves

stances similar or analogous, valuable results might be reasonably expected. Perhaps we ought not to despair of one day obtaining such; but, *until then*, the psychology of the mind in relation to dreams must be utterly valueless, as a source of facts for scientific induction.

the truth of the whole Christian system in the same doubt—for should the soul be proved in the discussion of the question to be *material*, the doctrine of a future life is false, and Christianity a fable. What prudent man would place in jeopardy his immortal hope on the contingent decision of such a question? even if it were rational to hope a final and conclusive decision on it in the present state of our faculties?—But if the question be such that it is not likely or possible to be decided, or absolute certainty had upon it before our present state of existence ends, is not every renewed discussion of it a public mischief, by reviving or perpetuating doubt upon so momentous a subject? That it is a question upon which we never shall be able to arrive at certainty appears, upon a patient view of the difficulties that surround it, to be in the highest degree probable.—Many and strong are the arguments which may be offered to



satisfy a reasonable inquirer, that his research on this subject must be fruitless.—One, meets us in the very threshold—and alone might convince us that it is a question beyond our present capacities to solve, and that the utmost which the most astute and ingenious argument can effect is, to raise a feeble degree of probability in favour of one opinion or the other.—The difficulty I advert to arises from our ignorance both of matter and mind. •

It is abundantly clear, that, at present, we know nothing of matter—but that it is something having sensible qualities—extension, solidity, &c. &c. Even of these qualities, once universally believed and admitted to belong to matter, later experiments have taught us to doubt, and, in some instances, positively to deny their existence. As to the nature and essence of *that* in which the existing qualities adhere—the SUBSTRATUM, which we call MATTER, we are

confessedly totally ignorant; and some, even of Christian Philosophers, altogether deny the existence of any such entity.—Berkeley put forward the proposition boldly, and maintained it by arguments, perhaps not yet answered, except to the satisfaction of those with whom habit and the prejudices derived from it, have more influence than strictly logical proof. Now, if we be really ignorant *what matter is*, what the *substratum*, or subject is, in which the qualities to which we give the names, adhere, does it not seem to be irrational, futile, and fruitless, to discuss, with respect to any other given *entity*—as *mind*, whether it be, or be not MATERIAL?—for, admitting, for argument sake, that we have a much more extensive philosophical knowledge of *mind*, than it is alleged we really have,—how can we institute the inquiry, whether *mind* be the same, or diverse from that *other thing*—matter—of which, we must

confess, we know nothing? How can we place that of which we know nothing, in a state of comparison with another substance, thing, or entity, of which we have some, though not a perfect knowledge? In our ignorance of *matter*, as a substratum for known qualities—how can we be assured that the known qualities of matter may not inhere in various and different *substrata*?—nay, may they not be conceivable as existing to our understanding, without any *actual* substratum at all?—and, if so, whether mind may not be identical with some of those varieties, and not with others?

This observation would be applicable, even though we knew much more of mind than we do. But, at all events, is the positive and absolute knowledge we have of the mind, such as to enable us, with any rational hope of success, to institute the inquiry, *whether it be material*? Are we not in precisely the same state of ignorance of

mind, as an absolute entity, as we are of matter? Are we not obliged to speak of it; aye, and even *think* of it, in the same indistinct way as we do of matter, namely, as a substratum only of certain qualities; or, in which certain powers appear by its acts, to subsist, as the *something* which thinks, apprehends, perceives, reasons—has certain emotions, passions, &c. &c. We may, indeed, affirm, that *extension* is not *fear*, or *hope*—that *roundness*, or *squareness*, or *solidity* (which we *assume*, perhaps falsely, to be a quality of body) is not *love*, *hatred*, *ambition*, *avarice*, &c.; and this, because the ideas which we form of these several things, are respectively different?—Nay, on what safe ground of logick, reason, experiment, on *induction*, can we positively affirm, that that which is a substratum of *extension*, for instance, may not be the substratum also of some affection, or quality of mind? Shall we, by denying such possibilities, presump-

tuously limit the power of the Almighty ?— It is, indeed, remarkable, that in the adventurous spirit with which we have undertaken to class matter and spirit, body and soul, &c. we have not yet ventured to go farther in our nomenclature of classification of what we call material substances, and those which we call *spirit*, *soul*, *mind*, &c. than to give the latter classes the negative epithets of *immaterial*.—In other words, we do not hazard opinion, as to *what that is* which we call spirit, or mind, beyond declaring that it is *not* matter, whatever else it may be—i. e. that it is *immaterial*.

In addition to this difficulty which meets the inquirer at the outset, let it be recollected that the present subject of inquiry, is not now for the first time introduced to the notice of the learned and unlearned world ; that ever since the time—a very early period of the Christian æra, when the Platonic doctrine of the nature of the hu-

man soul was introduced from the Alexandrine School into the Christian Church (it is said by the Gnostics) scholastic divines, and metaphysical sophists, have been distracting the Christian world with their fruitless, if not mischievous debates on this beaten subject; must not the hope, therefore, of a final settlement *now*, by a brochure or two, even coming from the highest authority, be in the inverse ratio of the profitless length of the discussions, which the Christian world have been suffering under for ages. Look also—give even a transient glance—at a few of the arguments which are extant in this controversy of hopeless end, as against the arguments or assumptions of the Immaterialists, and then say whether the expectation of a satisfactory conclusive solution of the question, be not utterly hopeless. I do not write here, or pretend to argue the case of the Materialists; but, with the view of shewing,

if I can, that the point in controversy between them and their opponents, is one most unlikely, if not impossible, to be ever finally decided,—I may be permitted, perhaps, to hint a few of those arguments that are habitually urged against the immateriality of the soul. Before I do so, however, I would pray the reader to collect, condense, and arrange the arguments which have been advanced by the “Discourse;” let them be considered in such a manner as may impress them with their utmost force on the understanding, and let the reader then say what is the result on his mind of this gratuitous labour of the most able, most eloquent, and most learned man in the British Empire to prove, that the human soul is immaterial, or that, if *material*, it **MUST PERISH** with the body. Let this opinion be formed, however, by one whose mind is in that state which is absolutely necessary for fair and impartial judgment, free from the

bias of prejudice,\* of the habit of thinking *one way only* on the subject, and let him

\* On Laplace's *System de la Nature*, his Lordship gives what he calls an instance, or illustration of the possibility of the mind acting, in science, in a manner perfectly independent of the senses, and which he appears to rely on as a complete proof of the power of the mind, to acquire scientific knowledge, and exercise the reasoning power without the aid of them. It is thus :—

“ It is certain that the whole science of numbers, from the rules of elementary arithmetic, up to the highest branches of the modern calculus, could by possibility have been discovered by a person who had never in his life been out of a dark room—who had never touched *any body* but *his own*—nay, whose limbs had all his life been so fixed, that he had never exercised even upon his own body, the sense of touch ; indeed, we might even go so far as to say, who had never heard a sound uttered ; for the primitive ideas of numbers might, by possibility, have suggested themselves to his mind, and been made the grounds of all further calculations.”—The short answer to such a case is, that there could not be found, nor imagined, such a living man, unless it were in a state of the most perfect and deplorable idiotism ; and that the belief that such a case could be *possible*, is one of the strongest of imaginable instances, how far pre-conceived opinion and prejudice may carry a strong mind!



be also clear of the disqualifying circumstance of having adopted an hypothesis on the matter of the argument, and bound himself by a pre-conceived and declared opinion on the question. I would then confidently call for the judgment of such a man, whether the "Discourse" has not totally failed, either to prove the Immateriality of the mind, or that extinction must necessarily follow the dissolution of the body, even upon the principles of sound *Natural* Theology, supposing mind to be material. If his Lordship should be found, on his *unanswered* argument, to have left it doubtful whether he had proved the mind's immateriality, let the difficulties suggested by the following queries of the Materialists, be considered with the attention they deserve, and the reader may then decide for himself whether CERTAINTY is likely ever to be attained by argument in this most difficult and dark of all metaphy-

sical questions. They are stated as *queries*, as the most befitting form from one who proposes them as difficulties to be solved, not arguments to convince.

#### QUERIES.

If the mind be *immaterial*, i. e. a *spirit*—did it præexist? Did it so from eternity? If not, was it a special creation in each individual case—coterminous with birth—or with the act of conception of the body? or, *when* did this *separate* mind *independent of body* begin to exist? Was it produced *simul* and *semel* with the formation of the material human creature on the organization of the body? and by the operation of the same second cause? Does man beget *immaterial* beings by the action of matter?

If this be yet one of the undisclosed mysteries of nature [substitute any other word for this if it please not] why may we not as

safely consider that the mind is organized matter, and that this also remains an undisclosed mystery? Must we not in the supposed case of matter begetting mind resort to the power of the Creator, whose *modus operandi* is inscrutable by us—and if so, may we not as safely refer the materiality of the mind to the same source? Is there more difficulty in the one case than in the other.

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Does the Immaterialist assert that it is not within the power of the Almighty to communicate to matter the power of thinking? Is Locke's opinion that the power of the Deity may do this, absurd and incredible? If the Deity *may* do this, what becomes of all the Immaterialist's arguments from the *impossibility*, &c.

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If the "immaterial mind"—whose existence is called "separate and independent

of body"—be generated *simul* and *semel* with the body—how does it happen that at birth it possesses no one quality or power of thought beyond those which are equally to be found in all living animals? How does it happen that the powers of the mind from birth through infancy grow with the growth of body, and that the immaterial entity, whose essence is thought, acquires gradually—not *simul* and *semel*—its powers of thinking, &c. and that the use of the thinking power is taught and cultivated through and by *material* means?

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Is the organized brain—or part of it—essential to the act of thinking? Can the immaterial mind *think* without it? If it cannot, how can the “separate mind” be *independent of body*? depending, as it does in the supposed case, on a bodily organ for the exercise of that faculty which, or the

power of exercising which, is essential to its existence—thought?—If the brain be *not* essential to actual thought, how does it happen that no instance has ever occurred in which, the functions of the brain being suspended either by disease or partial destruction, the immaterial and independent mind was known to think?

If in physiology and psychology (for the case belongs to each branch) it were proved that in every instance in which the brain was by disease or otherwise rendered incapable of sound action, the mind became incapable of thought—or of sane and sound thinking—would not that amount to full proof by induction, that the immaterial mind is *dependent* on the bodily organ for the exercise of its distinguishing and essential quality—thought?

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If matter be incapable of thought, consciousness, &c. is it because it is *ex-*

*tended*—or because it is *solid*—or possesses any other and what particular quality? Whatever that particular quality may be, how is it shewn to be impossible—or a *contradiction in terms*—that matter to which it belongs, should be incapable of thought?

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If the organ of the brain be essential to the mind's exercising its thinking power, during the union of soul and body—does it not follow that the bodily organ *assists* in the production of thought—and if so, how can a *limit* be placed to the *quantity* of aid it may possibly give—or how say it may not be *possible alone*—altogether to produce it? in other words, how can a limit be placed to the power of the brain in producing perception and thought?

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If the mind be unable to think without the organ of the body during the continuance of the union of soul and body, on

what is grounded the belief that the mind shall be enabled to think *without bodily organs* after the dissolution by death? or is it the opinion of the Immaterialists that the mind, *in its state of survivorship* to body shall be able to *exercise the thinking power only on ideas remaining with it, that had been acquired by PERCEPTION during life, &c. &c.*? If these questions be answered by reference to Divine Power and Will, may not the same Divine Power and Will account for a thinking faculty in matter?

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If it be from the nature and powers of the *sentient* faculty in man that the *immateriality* of the mind and consequent necessary *survivorship of mind to body* is attributed by the Immaterialists, must not the same inference be made by analogy with respect to the lower animals, in which it is admitted the sentient faculty is found, though in a lower

degree? for how can degrees be measured so as to draw a line, &c.—for must it not be admitted that wherever there is *perception*, there must be *consciousness* of it in the *percipient*, however low in the scale of being it may be—and have we any idea of perception existing in the animal without *some effect apparent* being produced on the sentient? If so, does not the *sentient* principle stand in the place of—or is it itself identical with a capacity of thinking—analogous to the thinking of man? And if this power of thought so exists in the lower animal, is it produced by a *material* or *immaterial* cause or entity? If by material, why may not the human mind be *material* also?

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If the immaterial mind—*independent* of and *separate* from body, be *alone* the thinking power, how does it happen that in suspended animation, in swooning, &c. &c.



the mind is never known to exercise its peculiar faculty, thought?

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If the mind be immaterial, can it be *extended*? If it has extension, it has one of the properties of matter, and is so far *material*.—If it have not *extension*, then is it possible it should occupy *space*, and if not, can it be said to exist *in loco*? Is it in that case existing *anywhere*?—If not, how can such a mind be *always*, during life, *where* the body is, and *confined to it*?

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If mind be altogether *immaterial*, how can it operate on matter?—how can *mind* then govern the body? Can *matter* be operated upon by that which has no one quality or property in common with matter?

Is there not just the same reason to conclude that the powers of sensation and thought are the necessary result of a par-

ticular organization, as that sound is the necessary result of a particular concussion of the air?—In both cases equally the one constantly accompanies the other, and is there in nature a stronger argument for a necessary connexion of any cause and any effect?

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The foregoing abstract contains but a small part certainly of the arguments which have loaded the library shelves of many a metaphysical controversialist on the Immateriality of the Soul during even the last century. It is not for me, who profess myself unable to decide in favour of which side of the question the weight of argument turns, to give an opinion on the value of all or of any of them. Long and vexatious has been the disputation to which the amplification and discussion of them has extended,—it is not ended, and it is most reasonably to be feared it never will

end in conviction on either side. I have referred to them only to justify myself for venturing to doubt the propriety or the final success of selecting this or such a subject to prove the utility or illustrate the benefits of applying the method of Induction to the science of *Natural Theology*.—They will, I incline to think, fully answer that purpose, and I conjecture they form not an inappropriate introduction to a few observations on another topic of some importance connected with the main inquiry, whether *Induction* derived from psychology, be really and truly likely to prove a beneficial mode of illustrating and extending the Science of Natural Theology.—For one, I acknowledge, and with concern, that I fear the Noble Lord has been much too sanguine in his hopes on this subject.—My reasons, in addition to those which have already appeared on that head in the former part of the discussion, I shall

briefly state. Before doing so, however, it may be proper to call attention, in the first place, to the proposition in page 58, in which his Lordship states the extent to which he carries his hope and his doctrine on this subject. He says, "The mind is quite as much an integral *part of the universe* as matter,—it follows that the constitution and functions of the mind are *as much* the subjects of inductive reasoning and investigation as the structure and action of matter." Now there can be no doubt whatever but that so far as facts respecting mind can be ascertained, in such a way as to preclude the possibility of our being misled with respect to their truth or accuracy, the mind and its functions are so far fit subjects for inductive reasoning and investigation,—but surely, upon many grounds, it may be questionable, whether they can ever become *as much*, or *as fit* subjects for inductive investigation as the structure and action

of matter. The nature of the *facts* to be ascertained in order to obtain materials for induction on this subject matter, and the nature of the *evidence* by which we are to come at these facts, seem to throw great if not insuperable difficulties in the way of extending or establishing this science to the extent stated by his Lordship. Indeed, the result of his Lordship's efforts in the way in which he has conducted the inquiry respecting the immateriality of mind, and its separate existence, in this treatise, and the very moderate degree of success that has attended it, may seem to exemplify these difficulties.—Higher faculties or powers, better adapted to such a pursuit, surely can never reasonably be hoped in an inquirer on such a subject,—yet may I not, without presumption, ask what has been done by his Lordship's labours in the “ Discourse,” to add effectively to what had been done by his predecessors? What new fact to

forward induction has been discovered? What doubtful proposition in Natural Theology has been rendered certain, or even more intelligible or more clear? On the contrary, has it not been found that by bringing under discussion anew the cardinal proposition, *that mind is immaterial*, (whatever may have been the use he intended to make of the proposition when proved) the weight of evidence in its favour seems to have been diminished, by the discovery that it had been in part supported by unsound reasoning,—that what had been assumed as fact, proves little more than mere opinion, or vague and loose conjecture, and that for want of facts ascertained or ascertainable by our present faculties, to support a legitimate *induction*, the question has retrograded rather than advanced.—Indeed the difficulties that lie in the way of applying successfully the method of induction to subjects which like Natural Theology,

are not strictly speaking *science*, are nearly insuperable—they arise chiefly from the nature of the evidence, by which alone we are to acquire the materials for our inductive reasoning.

The whole course of his Lordship's inquiry in the tract before us proves that this evidence must be derived from the *operations of our own minds*—and chiefly from that one which has been so constantly and unsparingly resorted to by him, our individual *consciousness*. Now assuredly nothing can be more vague—more variable—and therefore more uncertain as a guide to exact truth—than consciousness in the manner in which it is popularly used—*that* loose and indefinite *consciousness* with which we have been dealing hitherto. When it becomes a question, as it does here, whether upon what is called *consciousness* we can build inductions that are to be a base for scientific truth—it becomes necessary

to look for a little more precision, as to what we ought properly to understand by that term.—Now it strikes me that the first step in our progress towards this end is to examine what that is, which, excluding the external world from our thoughts, we find within ourselves as the immediate object of our contemplation—and next to take care that we distinguish between *that* and our own deductions or impressions made from other sources. It will be found, I think, that in such a position or state of the mind, we find first, some ideas, one or more, suggested by the senses; these must be the proper objects of immediate consciousness—and, next to these, may be the feeling or impression that those ideas are not only the subject of the mind's immediate contemplation—but that they are now before the mind through the medium of *memory*—and next in order, we may be conscious that we have the power of com-



bining, or dividing, or arranging those ideas in the manner which is said to produce judgment or reasoning—and it may happen also that we feel those ideas produce an effect upon the bodily power and end in a mental act—Volition.

I apprehend that these are the proper objects, and perhaps exclusively so, of consciousness, and that what goes beyond these will be found to be a *reasoning*,—a *forming of inferences* upon the ideas thus before the mind—which reasoning or act of inference may be just or erroneous according to the respective capacity for reasoning, which the individual mind may possess.—What the mind *feels* therefore to be immediately before it in contemplation of its own state or acts—and also what the mind actually *does* in the arrangement or disposition of the ideas actually before it,—*that* we may be correctly said to be *conscious* of—to know by intuition—but the *opinion* or

*judgment* which the mind may form as to what itself is—or what its essence may be—all this must be, *can* be but *opinion*, and like other opinions or judgments may be right or wrong—and for the truth or justness of these no man's assertion can be taken.

With all the guards which we may place upon the operation of our own minds in order to separate *mere consciousness* from becoming an act or inference of our *reasoning faculty*, there will still be great danger of the one merging in or mixing with the other; and therefore, perhaps nothing is more difficult in the act, or doubtful in the result, than this endeavour to ascertain with precision what it is that the mind is really conscious of, and conscious of *merely* and exclusive of any mixture of fancy or judgment, or taint from prejudice, or preconceived opinion—inveterate, perhaps, from time, and strengthened by party or personal interests. Now, let any unpre-

judiced reasoner, look at the nature of *consciousness* and of the difficulties that surround the ascertainment of *what it is* that the mind can be truly and properly conscious of, unmixed with opinion, and let him then consult his own judgment, taking one instance as a sample—and say what credit would be due to the statement of one who would deliberately say he is *satisfied* by *consciousness* that the *mind*—the thinking substance—an *entity which thinks*—is *simple* and *indivisible*, *immaterial* and *separate* and totally *independent of body*, and all or any of the bodily organs! When such a reasoner has pronounced his judgment on that point, he may then be consulted on the other, which we are now considering—namely—whether from *consciousness* it is reasonable to hope that *facts* can be elicited which may found an INDUCTION on which a *Scientific Natural Theology* can safely rest.

But other difficulties stand in the way

of inductive reasoning on metaphysical or theological subjects, in which the operations of the mind are to be the medium of proof. Suppose it be granted that some *one* mind may be able to satisfy itself upon its own mental experience, and have a full and distinct conviction and *consciousness* of some material proposition, which he announces to the world as a discovery. A question then arises—is this opinion or declaration of this one individual to be taken as an ascertained truth in science to be a ground for *induction*? If not, how is this discovery, or fact, or opinion of the individual, to be dealt with for a scientific purpose? A fact or experiment in physics, ascertained by *one*, may be repeated by others—by the whole scientific world—until the scientific discovery which that experiment supplies, shall become an indisputable scientific truth; but can this be done in psychology? If *A* be *conscious* of

a fact, may not *B*, if he try the experiment on his own mind, come to a different result, either by being a more or a less exact experimentalist? May we not, in fact, have almost as many different opinions as there are persons who will take the trouble of thinking or writing on the subject? In a word, can we hope, upon such subject, by such means, to come at any thing but opinions—the opinions of individuals of different degrees of authority in point of mental character, and opinions of contradictory, or various tendency? The whole history of psychological and theological controversy most abundantly satisfies us on this head. Upon what question connected with the philosophy of mind, even as the science (if it may be dignified with that name) now stands, are the philosophers of mind at the present moment perfectly agreed?—so that the inquirer may lay his finger on the particular proposition and say, “*this* at least

is undoubted truth—there is no shade of difference here—there is perfect unanimity upon it?” How very different is the state of physical and mathematical science. Some questions may, perhaps, remain unsettled and debateable, but absolute certainty has been obtained to a great extent in the several departments and range of *those* sciences that affect the interests or well being of society, or even tend to the pleasure or gratification of the curiosity of mankind. And this has happened because those sciences depend upon physical experiment, or scientific calculation which are within the reach of all who think proper to qualify themselves for making those experiments or calculations. The experiment of one is capable of being made by all other on the precisely same subject matter and under the same exact circumstances, or others different as the inquirer may desire—and thus, errors are detected,

truth ascertained, and science ultimately extended. How different would have been the result, if the success of those sciences had depended on what every experimentalist might discover by moping in the darkness of his own mind, working with instruments and on a subject matter, of which none but himself could know the true nature or value; consulting his own *consciousness* as to the discovery he had made, and publishing results, the truths or the errors of which were incapable of examination or detection by others? Yet such must be the result, it is much to be feared, in many, in *numerous* instances, if the inductive method be relied on in Natural Theology, through what is called psychology.

Nothing, indeed, appears so hopeless as that scientific truth should be obtained on subjects of the most abstruse nature, and perfectly alien from the habits of thinking

of the mass of mankind, and where that knowledge can be attained only through the medium of the isolated opinions of individuals, incapable of corroboration, or correction, by the judgment of others on the same identical materials. As well might it be expected that we should attain science in policy or legislation, by an *induction* founded on the opinions of a populace—or, of what may sound more respectably—popular opinion. But legislators have had before them ever since Civil Government was known among mankind—materials, apparently as well adapted to the inductive method of obtaining legislative wisdom or truth, as are the materials which we have for founding *induction* to promote what is called the science of Natural Theology. Indeed, Natural Theology, and the kind of proofs which support it, as well as establishments for divinity of another kind, have been in the hands of legislators from age to



age, and they have worked with them, professedly for promoting the science of good government :—the result, however, of their labours, does not afford any convincing proof of their efficacy in the way of scientific certainty.—*History* itself, indeed, has been nothing more than a compilation of *inductive facts*, on which those legislators have been proceeding in the research of legislative truth :—yet, what certainty in Legislative Philosophy have they established by which posterity shall, hereafter, be enabled to guide their safe and certain course on Civil Government ?—Where is the **MAXIM**—the application of which must not be varied with incidental or varying events ? The history of our own times—even of his Lordship's times alone—shew on what uncertain, controvertible, and even contradictory principles, the enlightened legislature, of the most enlightened and scientific people on the face of the earth, have governed ;—

and that, too, in an age, when, beyond all others, knowledge of every kind, and scientific knowledge particularly, had made the greatest advances. It may then, perhaps, be not an unsafe inference to make from the whole, that, while facts on which induction is to be grounded, are of such a nature, and to be collected only like those which are to be had in the science of Civil Government, or Natural Theology—the same success cannot be hoped from induction as in the physical and certain sciences.

I cannot, perhaps, close these remarks more properly than by adverting to an observation which has been made by his Lordship, in the note to page 79, adverting to the fact, that, in Dr. Paley's work, no allusion whatever is made to the argument urged by his Lordship generally through his discourse—"that, upon the scheme of materialism, no rational, indeed, no intelligible account can be given of a first cause; and that the

Doctor also leaves entirely untouched all the inductive arguments derived, to use his Lordship's expression, from the phenomena of mind."

That Dr. Paley should not have touched on the subject of those arguments which his Lordship uses to shew materialism inconsistent with any intelligible account of a first cause, or of the creation and government of the universe, may not appear extraordinary to those who are not of opinion with his Lordship on the nature and constitution of the mind—of whom, I strongly incline to think Dr. Paley was one—but whether his silence is rightly attributed to this cause, or not, it, perhaps, will be thought rather creditable to the motive and to the discretion of Dr. Paley, that he did not enter into this interminable discussion, and particularly in such a work as his *Natural Theology*. We have now seen with how little success his Lordship has

entered into and carried on this—which I cannot help calling—polemical and metaphysical warfare. If Dr. Paley had engaged in it with no other weapons than the assumptions which have been found necessary, even by his Lordship, to protect the opinions he has thought it right to adopt—could he have hoped to produce that useful conviction of salutary truths, urged with homely and plain-sense arguments for which his Essay has been so creditably distinguished ?

If like, I believe, the great majority of reasonable men, who feel that their understandings are not equal to the comprehension of subjects involved in the most entangled part of the metaphysical web, Dr. Paley does set apart this question, as one upon which he did not feel himself bound, because he felt he was unequal, to decide for himself or others, is he not entitled to the praise of sound discretion, as he cer-

tainly is to that of rational piety? If he abstained from entering on the discussion of this perplexing question, from "distaste of metaphysical researches," is it certain that the tone and character of his mind is by this much disparaged? For undoubtedly there are not a few, who have occupied places in the highest rank of literature and science, who have shared with him in that quality of taste. If even he has added to the guilt of wanting a taste for metaphysics, that of begging the whole of a question which he was professing to argue, the reader even of this little tract may be able to recollect, at least, *one* name of the very highest order who has frequently committed this naughty trick, apparently with a very easy conscience, and who possibly may conceive even the gentlest animadversion too severe for the offence.

Indeed, upon a consideration of Dr. Paley's book, it appears to be reasonably

certain, that his opinion was not made up upon this question of the immateriality of the mind—or that at all events he determined to avoid pronouncing any opinion on it. In the few latter pages of his *Natural Theology*, adverting to the resurrection of the human dead, he writes with studied caution to avoid a declaration of any opinion on the essence or nature of the human soul, manifestly intimating, however, that either alternative may be adopted by the sincere Christian. The passage to which I allude is so apposite to the subject which has occupied a great part of his Lordship's work, that I must entreat the reader to take the trouble of referring to it at large. I can introduce here, as a quotation, only the passage of similar bearing in his *Evidences of Christianity*, which shews, I think, that the tendency of his mind was to adopt and reconcile to the understanding, the materiality of the soul. The passage is this :—

“ If any one find it too great a strain upon his thoughts to admit the notion of a substance strictly immaterial, that is, from which extension and solidity are excluded, he can find no difficulty in allowing that a particle, as small as a particle of light, minuter than all conceivable dimensions, may just as easily be the vehicle of consciousness, as the congeries of animal substance which forms a human body, or the human brain ; that being so, it may transfer a proper identity to whatever shall hereafter be united to it, may be safe amidst the destruction of its integuments, may connect the natural with the spiritual, the corruptible with the glorified body. If it be said that the mode and means of all this is imperceptible by our senses, it is only what is true of the most important agencies and operations. The great powers of nature are all invisible—gravitation, electricity, magnetism,—though constantly exerting their influence,

—though within us, near us, and about us ; though diffused throughout all space, overspreading the surface or penetrating the contexture of all bodies with which we are acquainted, depend upon substances and actions which are totally concealed from our senses. The Supreme Intelligence is so himself.”

**THE END.**

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## ERRATA.

In reference at bottom of page 15—for “8th sect.” read  
“5th section.”

Page 17—in 8th line, after “to,” read “future.”

— 26—last line, begin the parenthesis at “many”.

— 46—line 2, after “and” read “if,” and in 3d line  
dele “if”.

— 65—last line, after word “section” add “to the 5th”.

— 66—7th line, before “which”, read “in”,—and for  
“designates” read “gives”.

— 71—in 2nd line, after “in” read “what is called  
the psychological argument in”.

— 75—line 13, for “and” read “of”.

— 78—line 8, before “procreation” read “of”.

















